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ABSTRACT 
 The intelligence community is responsible for providing competent analysis and 
assessments pertaining to the many significant geo-political situations that may potentially or do 
effect the nation’s interests.  The intelligence community has always experienced challenges 
living up to that charge, and while it may merely be a case of the nature of the profession, there 
are always lessons that can be learned and processes that may improve the analytical processes.  
Critical thinking is a cognitive process that may be able to provide that improvement to the 
analytical processes, and when an analytical framework is built by applying these cognitive 
skills, the analytical effort may become more focused and meaningful. 
 This study examined an intelligence analysis framework that was built using specific 
cognitive critical thinking skills.  It was demonstrated that intelligence analysis did improve, 
specifically with the novice analysts that participated, and there was demonstrated specificity in 
the respondents’ analyses.  A panel of experts provided insight and content assurance that 
demonstrated the intelligence analysis and products produced were valuable for operational 
usage.  Finally, successful historical counterinsurgencies were examined in relationship to the 
analytical framework that was utilized in order to understand how this analysis can lead to 
operational success. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
The Intelligence Community routinely has been blamed for providing “wrong” 
information, bad assessments, inaccurate judgments, or a myriad of other determinants to 
demonstrate why something tragic happened or whether or not a sound decision was made 
(McConnell 2008; Cerami & Engel, 2010).  Some of the greatest tragedies in U.S. history, i.e. 
Pearl Harbor and 9/11, have been dubbed “intelligence failures” (McConnell; Cerami & Engel).  
The recent outgoing Director of National Intelligence summed up his frustrations when he 
mentioned that everything is either an operational success or intelligence failure (McConnell).  
This is not to say the intelligence field will ever be able to make the perfect assessment, or even 
have access to the best information possible, but rather it should make us reassess the way we 
conduct our analysis in order to determine if we are providing the most complete, relevant, and 
unbiased estimates possible.   
While many intelligence analysts may believe they are thinking critically about the 
information they are receiving, the reality was that not many analysts were formerly trained in 
critical thinking.  Critical thinking provides a framework for the analyst in order to ensure his 
assessments are thorough and reasonably objective in nature.  Also, by applying a critical 
thinking framework to intelligence analysis, it was possible to incorporate critical thinking into a 
domain-specific methodology instead of teaching critical thinking with the hope of it transferring 
into the analyst’s assessments.  Critical thinking in itself will not provide that perfect assessment, 
but it may ensure the analyst has objectively valued his holdings while maintaining all pertinent 
and potential alternatives.  Therefore, an analyst who applies critical thinking to his analysis will 
ensure that he does not let his biases dictate what the information means, and he will determine 
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value of competing alternatives in order to mitigate rash judgments.  Applying critical thinking 
to intelligence analysis in not only paramount for the quality of the analysis itself, but in today’s 
unconventional environments it is more important than ever.  The counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations in which we find ourselves today in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also the combating of 
terrorist or counterterrorism operations may become routine missions for the U.S. Army, and as 
such, it is imperative that we modify our analytical procedures to face these challenges.  
Introduction to the Conceptual Framework 
 Critical thinking provides a way for one to think systematically and objectively, which 
can lead to more holistic and comprehensive solutions to specific problems or situations.  There 
are many definitions for critical thinking, but all agree that the ability to apply critical thinking 
skills improve the quality of one’s cognitive process and help identify bias that could skew or 
misrepresent the solutions that are being sought. 
 There were two main schools of thought, Facione’s (2010) and Paul and Elder’s (2002), 
pertaining to the teaching and implementation of critical thinking skills; they include applying 
critical thinking skills to one’s cognitive ability, or applying critical thinking skills in a domain-
specific manner.  Domain-specific refers to taking those specific cognitive skills that critical 
thinking may enhance and apply them to a specific discipline.  In other words, changing or 
enhancing the process that one utilizes when conducting his analysis or solving a problem for 
instance.  
 Intelligence analysis is the study of specific information that, when analyzed in context to 
a specific mission or situation, provides situational awareness and understanding for military 
commanders or national policymakers can utilize when making decisions.  Intelligence may be 
provided through various means, information received from a person was known as human 
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intelligence or HUMINT, information received through communications was known as signals 
intelligence or SIGINT, information received through pictures or satellite imagery was known as 
imagery intelligence or IMINT, information received through studying terrain or geospatial data 
was known as geospatial intelligence or GEOINT, information received through open-source 
media was known as open source intelligence or OSINT, and so forth. 
 The Army intelligence analyst is charged with analyzing all the data received through the 
various collection of information and then fusing that data into specific products.  This analysis 
is conducted by utilizing known information about a specific threat, country, or situation and 
then updating it based on previous holdings and/or additional collection. 
 This study will focus on how critical thinking can be incorporated into how the U.S. 
Army conducts intelligence analysis, and through that incorporation improve an intelligence 
analyst’s ability to provide more thorough, objective, and applicable assessments.  The U.S. 
Army teaches intelligence analysis through a deliberate process, Field Manual (FM) (2-01.3), 
known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in which a problem may be analyzed 
and applied to a specific situation; however, I would argue that it does not instruct the analyst in 
how to think about the information in an unbiased manner.  This in itself is the crux of the 
problem.  Without teaching methodologies in which an analyst can discern how the analyst 
approaches the problem, it opens the door to pitfalls that are easy and convenient to fall into. 
 In order to conduct this study, I have led in developing a conceptual framework that 
applies critical thinking to intelligence analysis in a domain-specific manner, known as the 
Critical Thinking Intelligence Analysis Process or CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  This 
framework utilizes Facione’s (2010) definition of critical thinking, and was built utilizing each 
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cognitive skill that Facione identifies into each step of the Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield and Intelligence Analysis processes. 
 The CTIAP framework focuses the analyst from the very beginning of the IPB process.  
Essentially, step one and two of IPB were fused together to identify all potential consideration of 
the battlefield through the study of the operational environment (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  This 
then provides the analyst the ability to focus his analysis on any potential threat group or other 
entity that needs consideration pertaining to the way that group conducts operations, and the 
potential areas that this threat group needs to influence (Hess & Friedel).  Based on this analysis, 
the analyst can begin to provide predictive analysis based on those areas that are specific to the 
groups in question (Hess & Friedel).  This process would then essentially provide a basis for a 
collection plan that the analyst can focus specifically to each group in question (Hess & Friedel). 
 Finally, the CTIAP framework provides the analyst the ability to affect the operational 
environment in which he is operating.  As he identifies the areas or targets that a potential group 
needs to affect, the analyst can identify the corresponding factors that affect the overall 
operational environment.  This model may also provide the analyst the ability to assess the 
effectiveness of the operations that were, and are, being conducted. 
 The significance of the CTIAP process is that it has the potential to improve the way 
intelligence analysts are trained, and enhance their analysis.  Too often analysts believed that 
they were not really providing analysis or truly solving problems.  Rather, it seems there was a 
growing feeling from intelligence analysts that they are glorified reporters who have access to 
classified information (Johnston 2005).  The CTIAP process, if utilized, may help the analyst 
build a product that not only focuses analysis, but also focuses on providing a comprehensive 
and systematic way to make that analysis predictive in nature (Hess & Friedel, 2008). 
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Statement of the Problem 
The U.S. Army, which may be considered a hierarchical organization, was accustomed to 
controlling the mission it conducts and the individuals that serve in those missions.  This control 
is important for a military organization to ensure it has the ability to execute missions in 
extremely dangerous and demanding situations.  However, the same chain-of-command 
hegemony creates a challenging dilemma for an intelligence analyst by introducing cultural, 
organizational, and cultural biases.  An intelligence analyst needs to be able to present his 
assessment in an unbiased and substantiated manner, and when that assessment is provided to an 
individual who truly controls his life and livelihood, the analyst tends to fashion his analysis 
along the lines of what that commander thinks.  These biases, introduced by the structure of the 
military, substantially changes the way the process of intelligence analysis is conducted 
(Johnston 2005).  The analyst may, however, overcome this challenge, by incorporating critical 
thinking methodologies to the process in which he conducts his analysis.  It will not necessarily 
change the commander’s acceptance of the assessment, but the process will be integrated with 
providing all probable situations through an objective and quantified presentation of information 
(Hess & Friedel, 2008).  The intelligence community is constantly trying to find better ways to 
conduct analysis in order to improve analytical efforts.   
If we can improve intelligence analysis with a domain-specific application of critical 
thinking, then the following questions must be answered.  How does critical thinking improve 
intelligence analysis?  Can a domain-specific application of critical thinking to intelligence 
analysis provide a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessment that is pertinent to 
decision makers?  Can the use of critical thinking in intelligence analysis lead to assessments that 
impact decisions that may save Soldiers’ lives or at least keep them out of unnecessary 
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situations?  Can a curriculum be developed that applies the CTIAP methodology?  These 
questions will be explored more thoroughly as we look at a framework in chapter two that may 
improve the ability of intelligence to influence decisions in a comprehensive and specific way. 
The U.S. Army believes that intelligence drives operations, and therefore intelligence is 
not only essential for operational success, but also the impetus that drives mission requirements 
found in FM (2-0).  Conversely, operations do not, and should not; drive intelligence, but rather 
commanders and decision makers should drive intelligence collection efforts (FM 2-0).  
According to FM 3-24, IPB in a COIN or counterterrorism environment utilize the same process 
found in FM 2-01.3, however, it places greater emphasis on civil considerations.  This reflects 
the importance of utilizing a critical thinking framework, as the intelligence process is evolving 
and constantly updating. 
Purpose for the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine if a valid critical thinking framework applied to 
intelligence analysis can improve the intelligence analyst’s ability to provide meaningful 
assessments and recommendations, and also to potentially limit the pitfalls or failures that 
intelligence analysts are prone.  This study also examined if the analysis provided through the 
CTIAP methodology was more useful and meaningful to commanders than the traditional IPB 
method.   
Research Question.  How does a domain-specific application of critical thinking to intelligence 
analysis provide a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessment that is pertinent to 
decision makers?   
 In order to sufficiently answer the research question, two research methods were utilized 
in this study: the case study and grounded theory.  The case study was used to evaluate the 
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products and assessments produced from a group of cadets at the United States Military 
Academy.  Grounded theory was used to identify areas that lead to success in two historical 
counterinsurgencies. 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study was the potential for improvement in intelligence analysis 
when utilizing the CTIAP methodology.  While there was great benefit to applying critical 
thinking to intelligence analysis holistically, the reality is the COIN and counterterrorist 
environments are vastly more complex and dynamic than the conventional force-on-force 
military operations. 
First, through the application of critical thinking, the intelligence process may produce 
more specific and accurate assessments.  These assessments may ensure those battlefield 
operations being conducted are targeting the right individual or having the desired effect. Better 
analysis may lead to better decisions, therefore, keeping Soldiers out of needless situations, 
which may save lives.  When operations are focused toward specific objectives, it was my 
contention that they will have a larger impact against the stated goal of the mission.  They will 
also have a tendency to disrupt the operations of threat forces if those objectives are tied to the 
operational environment that ultimately may determine the outcome of the conflict. 
Secondarily, especially in an unconventional environment, non-lethal targeting has been 
under appreciated, and not viewed as important or glamorous as lethal targeting. Regardless, 
both lethal and non-lethal targeting need to be thoroughly planned and incorporated into a unit’s 
operations in order to achieve the desired effects. The application of critical thinking into these 
assessments may help the analyst understand the pros and cons of each targeting approach when 
studying the situation and anticipating the desired effects.  
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Also, by incorporating critical thinking into the intelligence analysis process, it will help 
the analyst understand what he has not considered. For instance, it was not uncommon for an 
intelligence analyst to put together a solid assessment of what he thinks a certain threat group has 
been trying to accomplish. In doing so, the analyst recommends a target for the commander in 
order to capture or kill a certain individual, or even recommends another mission in which the 
threat group could be neutralized or countered. The analyst may not understand why when an 
operation was conducted based on his analysis, targeting an individual or perhaps protecting a 
piece of critical infrastructure, and then the individual was not there or an attack did not occur. 
Routinely, the commander and operational units get frustrated with the intelligence when this 
happens, but there may be a good chance that the operation stopped a certain action or individual 
from trying to accomplish something. Therefore, through a comprehensive and deliberate 
application of critical thinking to the analyst’s analysis, these important aspects may be 
discovered and assessed.  
Finally, by applying critical thinking to intelligence analysis in a domain-specific 
manner, it was reasonable to believe analysts would be better trained from the beginning and, by 
doing so; they would become more adept and agile analysts earlier in their career. It was not 
uncommon to see a unit have junior enlisted Soldiers, or even those who were not very 
competent, perform other jobs such as a guard, clerk, or manual labor.  When given the 
challenging environment of unconventional warfare, it would seem that we would want as many 
competent analysts working their craft instead of pulling guard duty.  By improving the way we 
train our analysts, we could create more effective and valuable assets for the U.S. Army. 
Conducting this study may provide evidence that a critical thinking framework may be 
established as a valid approach to analyzing intelligence. Using this framework to improve the 
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curriculum at the various schools that train intelligence analysts could ultimately develop 
analysts that have greater situational awareness and understanding of the impact their work.  This 
framework may provide an effective mean ensuring intelligence analysis provides objective and 
thorough assessments that will support both current and future warfare. 
Definition of Terms 
Critical Thinking  
            “We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment 
which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well 
as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, 
or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based. CT is 
essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is a liberating force in education 
and a powerful resource in one’s personal and civic life. While not 
synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-rectifying 
human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well- 
informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation,  
honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to  
reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking  
relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry,  
and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the 
circumstances of inquiry permit. Thus, educating good critical thinkers means 
working toward this ideal. It combines developing CT skills with nurturing 
those dispositions which consistently yield useful insights and which are the 
basis of a rational and democratic society” (Facione, 2010, p. 22). 
 
Critical Thinking Framework  
The critical thinking framework includes the following cognitive skills: Interpretation, 
Analysis, Evaluation, Inference, Explanation, and Self-Regulation (Facione, 2010). Each of the 
aforementioned skills of the critical thinking framework will be defined in the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
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Interpretation  
“To comprehend and express the meaning or significance of a wide variety of 
experiences, situations, data, events, judgments, conventions, beliefs, rules, procedures, or 
criteria” (Facione, 2010, p. 5). 
Analysis  
“To identify the intended and actual inferential relationships among statements, 
questions, concepts, descriptions, or other forms of representation intended to express belief, 
judgment, experiences, reasons, information, or opinions” (Facione, 2010, p. 5). 
Evaluation  
“To assess the credibility of statements or other representations which are accounts or 
descriptions of a person’s perception, experience, situation, judgment, belief, or opinion; and to 
assess the logical strength of the actual or intended inferential relationships among statements, 
descriptions, questions or other forms of representation” (Facione, 2010, p. 5).  
Inference  
“To identify and secure elements needed to draw reasonable conclusions; to form 
conjectures and hypotheses; to consider relevant information and to educe the consequences 
flowing from data, statements, principles, evidence, judgments, beliefs, opinions, concepts, 
descriptions, questions, or other forms of representation” (Facione, 2010, p. 6).  
Explanation  
“To state and to justify that reasoning in terms of the evidential, conceptual, 
methodological, criteriological, and contextual considerations upon which one’s results were 
based; and to present one’s reasoning in the form of cogent arguments” (Facione, 2010, p. 6).  
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Self-Regulation  
“Self-consciously to monitor one’s cognitive activities, the elements used in those 
activities, and the results educed, particularly by applying skills in analysis, and evaluation to 
one’s own inferential judgments with a view toward questioning, confirming, validating, or 
correcting either one’s reasoning or one’s results” (Facione, 2010, p. 7).  
Counterinsurgency 
 A counterinsurgency, COIN, is a military operation specifically focused toward defeating 
an insurgency (Researcher Defined).  
Intelligence Analysis 
 The U.S. Army does not have a definitive definition of intelligence analysis.  Therefore, I 
submit the following.  Intelligence Analysis is the process of collecting information and 
examining it against other known variables in order to determine the value of that information in 
a specific context.  The information collected is through overt and covert means, and is derived 
through various sources (Human, Geospatial, Measurements, Signals and Communications, 
etc…) (Researcher Defined). 
Insurgency 
 An insurgency is usually a conflict in nature, which is specifically focused toward 
overthrowing the ruling government of a country.  An insurgency comes from within the 
country, and typically formed by groups of individuals that are frustrated and have abandoned 
any hope of changing the ruling government through purely political means (Researcher 
Defined). 
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Lethal Targeting 
 Lethal targeting is an operation conducted against an individual or place using weapon 
systems with the intent to capture, control, kill, or destroy (Researcher Defined). 
Non-lethal Targeting 
 Non-lethal targeting is an operation or groupings of operations focused toward 
influencing the larger objective.  Non-lethal targets are typically nested toward creating 
favorable conditions in a specific operation or larger campaign plan.  Examples of non-lethal 
targets could be building bridges, providing jobs, engaging religious leaders in dialogue, etc… 
(Researcher Defined). 
Terrorism 
 Terrorism is a means of non-governmental actors trying to cause change to a country, 
region, or organization through the use of fear.  Terrorism is usually violent in nature, and 
routinely kills innocent victims while those conducting the attacks try to attack their target.  
Terrorism is about power, and it typically is manifested in fear, violence, and propaganda.  
Terrorist groups can be regional, national, or transnational, and their ideology typically defines 
their geographic orientation.  Terrorism can also be manifested in religion, political ideology, or 
otherwise (Researcher Defined). 
Limitations, Delimitations and Assumptions 
Limitations of the study.  The study was a performance-oriented case-based scenario in 
which the participants were using messages in order to provide multiple assessments as to what 
is currently happening and what will happen next in a contrived case-based setting. The main 
limitation of the study was assuming to evaluate all the participants’ assessments equally, given 
the subjective nature.  
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In this study it was challenging to find suitable participants, those that have the necessary 
analytical experience as determined by rank, experience, and responsibility.  The participants 
were cadets pursuing a minor in terrorism studies at the United States Military Academy at West 
Point, and therefore my pool of participants was limited.  Despite these limitations, there will be 
greater understanding of the CTIAP, which will develop more questions and further research. 
Another limitation may have been in the understanding and clarity of the messages and 
scenario presented to participants during the case study.  To address this, a pre-survey group with 
less experience than the mandate for the study, read through the scenario and messages to help 
ensure the situation was interpreted correctly.  The interpretation was not specific to achieving a 
specific assessment, but rather that the participants understood the content of the scenario and 
messages. 
Because this was a qualitative study, the results were not generalizable to a larger 
population of analysts, but that was not the goal of this research.  Rather, the goal of this research 
was to examine the contextual usefulness of the CTIAP model.  It may be possible that these 
findings manifest in studies of similar situations along with similar subjects. 
A final limitation of the study that I was concerned about was the Hawthorne Effect 
(Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).  This may have been an issue when participants answered 
questions differently based on what they perceived to be more positive toward the study because 
of being observed (Gay, et al).  During my interviews, I attempted to control this limitation by 
asking specific questions pertaining to their analysis and how they arrived at their conclusions. 
Although not a limitation, I was concerned with collusion during the case-based scenario.  
One advantage I had during the study was that the participants were cadets at the United States 
Military Academy.  They have a strict honor code that they must adhere to, or risk being 
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dismissed from the academy.  I instructed them that all work during the case-based scenario must 
be their own, and that they could not help one another.  I also asked them at the beginning of 
each interview if they completed the exercise and produced their products without assistance. 
Delimitations of the study.  The major delimitation of the study was the experience of 
the students, who were the primary and secondary groups being surveyed. All participants were 
cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point.  They did not have real-world 
experience in either operations or intelligence analysis at the point of the data collection.  
However, as the cadets demonstrated that a domain-specific application of critical thinking 
substantively improved their ability to conduct intelligence analysis, then it may be reflective of 
the importance of exposing this type of process at the beginning of an intelligence analyst’s 
career. 
The final delimitation of the study was the case-based scenario. There was one scenario 
with one set of messages, which the cadets were not accustomed. The scenario was based on a 
fictitious country that appealed to the United States for assistance with an ongoing insurgency.  
There were messages based on operations occurring in the U.S. area of operations, which 
enabled the cadets to exercise the intelligence process.  The participants prepared the appropriate 
products in relation to the intelligence process according to FM 2-01.3, to include their ability to 
conduct predictive analysis.  Finally, I conducted the interviews with all of the participants in 
order to understand how they reached the conclusions that they presented. 
Assumptions of the study.  My assumptions were that the participants in this study 
would perform their analysis to the best of their ability, and that they would utilize the processes 
that they had been exposed to during the course of their analysis.  I also believed that the CTIAP 
methodology may improve the analyst’s ability to conduct his analysis, and that products may be 
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more focused and specific in nature.  Finally, I believed that intelligence analysis can be 
improved, and critical thinking provides a way for that improvement. 
I also believed that those who have learned intelligence analysis with critical thinking 
applied would have a greater understanding of the intelligence process. Many analysts have a 
tendency to start their analysis with a focus toward what is going to happen next, and those that 
were taught intelligence analysis with critical thinking applied may be more adept to understand 
the dynamic nature of intelligence analysis while ensuring they are thoroughly completing and 
applying all the steps to each other.  
Summary 
Intelligence Analysis is challenging, it also is of paramount importance in a COIN and 
counterterrorism environment. The intelligence field will never be perfect, for which there were 
too many reasons that were not relevant to this study; however, one of the main ones may be 
because an analyst will never have all available information or the best information. Therefore, 
an intelligence analyst must be able to provide a thorough, unbiased, and pertinent assessment 
that focuses commanders toward making well thought through and cause-and-effect based 
decisions. Applying critical thinking as a framework to intelligence analysis may be a very 
viable and powerful way that the U.S. Army’s intelligence analysts can learn and understand the 
many complexities of the unconventional battlefield. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 The restated purpose of this study is to examine the following research question:  How 
does a domain-specific application of critical thinking to intelligence analysis provide a more 
holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessment that is pertinent to decision makers?  This 
literature review focuses on studies that have analyzed various situations and methodologies 
pertaining to the instruction of critical thinking. Based on the notion that by employing a critical 
thinking framework which may be applied to intelligence analysis in order to improve the ability 
of an analyst to provide objective and substantive assessments, especially in a counterinsurgent 
or counterterrorism environment, the various studies demonstrates the advantage to employing 
such a framework. The research was organized through three major topics; effective teaching of 
critical thinking, domain-specific applications of critical thinking, and finally the effects of 
applying critical thinking in a domain-specific manner. 
 Intelligence should provide information that informs leaders, and inherent in that drives 
operations.  The ability of an intelligence analyst to provide thorough and objective assessments 
should be welcomed amongst the intelligence community, policy makers, and commanders that 
execute policy, because these assessments should provide substantive information that clarifies 
understanding and importance of decisions being made.  Good intelligence may lead to better 
decisions, and better decisions may lead to more focused policies and operations that benefit the 
country as a whole. 
Conceptual Framework 
 Since this study was focused on the Critical Thinking applied to Intelligence Analysis 
Process (CTIAP) written by Dr. Curt Friedel and myself (Hess & Friedel, 2008), I will discuss 
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this first.  The CTIAP was the conceptual framework being examined for the course of this 
study.  The CTIAP utilizes Dr. Peter Facione’s research that produced a definition, and specific 
cognitive skills necessary for effective critical thinking (Facione, 2010), and applies it to the U.S. 
Army’s intelligence analysis process found in FM 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield (IPB).  Facione’s six cognitive skills were interpretation, analysis, evaluation, 
inference, explanation, and self-regulation (Facione, p. 5). 
 As mentioned in chapter one, there were two predominate schools of thought pertaining 
to critical thinking; Facione (2010), and Paul and Elder (2002).  Facione’s (2010) research has 
focused on critical thinking aspects that can be applied domain-specifically, while Paul and 
Elder’s (2002) focus was more toward critical thinking as a stand-alone cognitive ability that 
generally improves thinking.  I chose Facione’s (2010) research as the basis for both the CTIAP 
(Hess & Friedel, 2008) and this study since I consider intelligence analysis unique as a discipline 
because it needs to be tailored to the specific mission that it may be utilized.  For instance, 
intelligence analysis may take on a different role in conventional warfare than in a COIN or 
counterterrorism operation. 
 The U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca does not subscribe to one specific 
methodology, but teaches from both Facione (2010) and Paul and Elder (2002).  While I believe 
there was value in teaching both approaches, Paul and Elder’s research may be difficult for an 
analyst to apply in very specific environments. 
Critical Thinking Skills 
Interpretation was defined as the ability, “…to comprehend and express the meaning or 
significance of a wide variety of experiences, situations, data, events, judgments, conventions, 
beliefs, rules, procedures, or criteria” (Facione, 2010, p. 5).  In other words, the analyst must 
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understand the context of information being evaluated, which could be rooted in culture, 
religious ideology, political gain, or various other nuances that could shape its meaning. The 
meaningfulness of the information may be categorized by the importance within these different 
domains or categorized by the meaningfulness to different group stakeholders. Also, the analyst 
must honestly consider personal experiences into how they evaluate information. Here alone the 
analyst can find tremendous amounts of bias or other superseding variables that affect how he 
assigns value to the information.  
 The cognitive skill analysis was defined as the ability, “…to identify the intended and 
actual inferential relationships among statements, questions, concepts, descriptions, or other 
forms of representation intended to express belief, judgment, experiences, reasons, information, 
or opinions” (Facione, 2010, p. 5).  How the information related to other holdings is one of the 
key aspects of analysis. The ability to study the parts separately (distinguishing facts from 
opinions and assumptions) and then holistically (forming arguments from facts, opinions and 
assumptions) may be challenging to say the least, but this is the cornerstone of analysis. This 
definition, while short in words, is long in ideals. Constantly questioning or making judgments of 
the information is a herculean effort that cannot be taken lightly. Nor can it be something that we 
take for granted. Again, the analyst must understand how biases can affect the way they look at 
the information and apply it to a larger situation. 
 Evaluation as a critical thinking skill was defined as the ability, “…to assess the 
credibility of statements or other representations which are accounts or descriptions of a person’s 
perception, experience, situation, judgment, belief, or opinion; and to assess the logical strength 
of the actual or intended inferential relationships among statements, descriptions, questions or 
other forms of representation” (Facione, 2010, p. 5). While evaluation may sound similar in 
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wording to interpretation and analysis, it must be noted that the phrase “assess the credibility” 
should focus one to assess the source of the evidence with respect to the authority and expertise 
of the individual as well as the logical strength of the information with regard to timeliness, 
implications, and other variables determined by the situation. Again, removing one’s biases is 
paramount, but not a given. It should also be noted that it may be impossible to remove all of our 
biases, so an analyst must constantly struggle to mitigate them. Further in this chapter, when this 
critical thinking framework is applied to intelligence analysis we will see techniques that can 
assist with removing biases in order to form stronger judgments. 
 Inference was, “…to identify and secure elements needed to draw reasonable 
conclusions; to form conjectures and hypotheses; to consider relevant information and to deduce 
the consequences flowing from data, statements, principles, evidence, judgments, beliefs, 
opinions, concepts, descriptions, questions, or other forms of representation” (Facione, 2010, p. 
6).  In exhibiting this skill, the analyst determines what may be concluded from the collective 
information. Developing initial hypotheses in order to test them in an unbiased and pertinent 
fashion is where the analyst should be focusing his or her efforts. It is challenging and detail-
oriented work, but important for the analyst to ensure that they let the information speak for itself 
and consider multiple options specific to the problem or situation that exists. 
 Explanation was defined as, “…being able to present in a cogent and coherent way the 
results of one’s reasoning. This means to be able to give someone a full look at the big picture: 
both ‘to state and to justify that reasoning in terms of evidential, conceptual, methodological, 
criteriological, and contextual considerations upon which one’s results were based; and to 
present one’s reasoning in the form of cogent arguments’” (Facione, 2010, p. 6).  For the 
intelligence analyst, the skill explanation was used to present conclusions and assessments that 
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were specific to the mission he was assigned. Providing explanation of the analysis of a situation 
which was not relevant or cogent to the larger task may be completely counterproductive. Also, 
the employment of a strong explanation may ensure that the analyst was not providing an 
assessment that was vague or more “strategic” than applicable to a particular mission. 
 Lastly, Self-Regulation was to, “…self-consciously monitor one’s cognitive activities, the 
elements used in those activities, and the resulted educed, particularly by applying skills in 
analysis, and evaluation to one’s own inferential judgments with a view toward questioning, 
confirming, validating, or correcting either one’s reasoning or one’s results” (Facione, 2010, p. 
7).  Self-regulation may perhaps be the most crucial cognitive skill for the intelligence analyst. It 
has been well-known that initial reports in the field were unclear and usually far from accurate, 
and routinely called “fog of war”. Therefore, it was imperative for the analyst to acquire a final 
and complete report, as well as update on all products and assessments resulting from incomplete 
reports. As aforementioned in the discussion of each critical thinking skill, self-regulation may 
be applied with each skill throughout the critical thinking process. By doing so, the information 
gleaned by each skill was questioned, confirmed and validated. Self-regulation was the step in 
which the analyst needed to ensure that various personal biases were removed as much as 
possible. Being aware of one’s biases was paramount to ensuring its presence is reduced. 
 The CTIAP method applies each of the six cognitive skills defined by Facione, and 
determines how they impact each step of the IPB process (Facione 2010).  According to FM 2-
01.3, there are four steps in the IPB process:  1) define the operational environment, 2) describe 
environmental effects on operations, 3) evaluate the threat, and 4) determine threat courses of 
action. 
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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
 Step one of IPB, define the operational environment, begins when the intelligence analyst 
studies the geographical area in which his unit has been assigned responsibility for a specific 
mission.  The geographical area is identified by the specific Area of Operations, Area of Interest, 
and Area of Influence (FM 2-01.3).  The area of operations is the specific geographical area that 
the unit has been assigned from their higher headquarters.  The area of interest identifies the area 
that may impact the unit’s area of operations, and finally the area of influence identifies the area 
that the unit may have a direct impact.  During step one; the analyst will create databases 
identifying specific details ranging from demographics to infrastructure capabilities.  Almost as 
important as the database that contain what analyst knows, the analyst also needs to identify what 
he does not know at this point.  This is known as intelligence gaps, and these gaps are the 
foundation for the development of information to be collected.  It was not necessary to discuss 
how the CTIAP differs from step one of IPB, as the CTIAP focuses on fusing the information 
ascertained from step one and step two. 
 Step two of IPB, describe the environmental effects on operations, ensues when the 
intelligence analyst studies the terrain and weather in relation to the impact on the unit’s 
operations (FM 2-01.3).  The analyst develops a comprehensive product known as the modified 
combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), which demonstrates the abilities of friendly and threat 
forces to maneuver and operate in the terrain.  For instance, the analyst would identify the road 
network in the unit’s area of operations, and determine how many tanks can move in an 
unrestricted, restricted, or severely restricted manner.  In a COIN or urban environment, the 
analyst also needs to consider the likely locations of weapons caches, dense population areas, 
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commercial areas, and so on.  Finally, the analyst attempts to determine how the weather may 
additional affect operations in these areas. 
 The CTIAP method does not attempt to change the requisite analysis that needs to be 
conducted in the first two steps of IPB (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  Rather, it focuses on how to add 
to it by fusing the information from both steps.  The CTIAP process adds a construct that 
incorporates step one and step two (Hess & Friedel).  The purpose of this fusion was to identify 
the significant operational impacts against the environment where found (Hess & Friedel).  The 
end result of this process was to identify the key nodes that have a direct or indirect impact on 
the mission, see appendix 1 (Hess & Friedel). 
 Step three of IPB, evaluate the threat, proceeds when the analyst develops doctrinal 
templates or vignettes on how the threat organizes its forces and fights (FM 2-01.3).  Other 
products that are part of step three include a pattern analysis wheel, depicting when events such 
as attacks typically occur; a study of threat capabilities, this typically identifies all weapons 
systems and their strengths, weaknesses, and ranges; and an association matrix; which identifies 
who may be associated to whom. 
 The CTIAP method utilizes the information developed in step three of IPB and builds 
templates or vignettes in relation to the nodes that were identified in the previous step of the 
CTIAP process (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  The product subsequently produced incorporates all 
factors of the warfighting functions found in FM 3-0 (Hess & Friedel).  The purpose of this effort 
is to identify all the assets or capabilities that the threat forces need to utilize to be successful in 
their operation. 
 Step four of IPB, determining threat courses of action, is where the analyst first tries to 
predict what the threat will attempt to do (FM 2-01.3).  Taking into consideration all the data 
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from the previous three steps of IPB, the analyst builds courses of action that best reflect how the 
threat forces will attempt to attack a certain objective.   
 The CTIAP method adds to this step by including objectively analyzed data to help 
determining those objectives (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  By assigning a simple one to five value 
based on the credibility of the source of the information, to reporting that the analyst receives, 
the analyst prioritizes the objectives based on the associated value (Hess & Friedel).   
 Conceptually, the utilization of the CTIAP was demonstrated in the following example.  
An intelligence analyst assigned to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) deployed to Mosul, Iraq 
begins his IPB process by completing an interface of the operational environment and terrain 
variable (similarly to appendix A) (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  Upon completion of the operational 
environment and terrain interface, the analyst would evaluate the insurgent groups operating 
within the BCT’s area of operations (Hess & Friedel).  He then would identify all the aspects 
from the interface that are essential for the insurgent groups’ success (working them one problem 
at time) (Hess & Friedel).  This nodal identification could provide immediate consideration for 
the analyst in determining future courses of action and collection requirements (Hess & Friedel). 
 As the analyst begins to receive information from the various sources that collect, he 
would assign a value (ranging from one to five) to each report (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  This 
value would be based on the source of the information, and not specifically the information 
within the report (Hess & Friedel).  After the analyst reviews the reports and assigns values to 
them, he would add up the information pertaining to what objectives the insurgent groups are 
focused towards (Hess & Friedel).  These values could potentially tell the analyst at least two 
things; one, what objectives (or nodes) a specific insurgent group may attack or attempt to 
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influence, and two, where his collection efforts may be weak and need attention (Hess & 
Friedel). 
 Finally, the intelligence analyst can refer back to the operational environment and terrain 
interface to identify other aspects that could potentially impact or have a relationship to the node 
or objective that the insurgent group may be targeting (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  The analyst then 
identifies ways to impact the related nodes favorably to the BCT’s mission (Hess & Friedel).  
This could strengthen the operational environment against the insurgent’s efforts to destabilize 
the environment, and build relationships that could provide information to assist in destroying or 
neutralizing the insurgent group (Hess & Friedel). 
Summary of Research Findings/Results for Critical Thinking 
 Critical thinking has been considered a widely-used term with a very ambiguous 
meaning. However, some researchers have thoroughly studied critical thinking and developed 
some useable definitions. While it would be too laborious to discuss the various definitions, one 
researcher, Peter Facione (2010), developed a set of cognitive skills that can be applied to 
teaching, utilizing, and assessing critical thinking skills. These cognitive skills are interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation; defined previously in this 
chapter.  Based on these cognitive skills, these reviews will focus on effective teaching of critical 
thinking, domain-specific application of critical thinking, and applying critical thinking to 
intelligence analysis.  
 Overall, teaching critical thinking in a deliberate and structured manner has produced 
tremendous results in the critical thinking abilities of students. However, teaching critical 
thinking in a domain-specific manner has a greater impact on students’ ability to apply critical 
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thinking skills (McKown, 1997). And lastly, critical thinking taught using problem-solving, 
hands-on exercises or asynchronous group projects typically produces the best critical thinkers. 
Learning Critical Thinking 
 For this study, it was important to identify effective ways of teaching critical thinking. By 
teaching critical thinking effectively, a deliberate methodology that incorporates tangible 
outcomes can be employed. Teaching critical thinking in an abstract and non-contextual manner 
may probably never truly demonstrate effective outcomes. Friedel, Irani, Rudd, Gallo, Eckhardt, 
and Ricketts (2008) studied the outcomes of students that were taught critical thinking skills 
overtly. This study demonstrated that those students that were taught critical thinking overtly 
demonstrated significantly higher levels of critical thinking. 
 Mazer, Hunt, and Kuznekoff (2007) conducted a study in a basic communications course, 
which demonstrated critical thinking may be fostered through student interaction. This study also 
found that an effective strategy for teaching critical thinking involved the instructor teaching 
critical thinking strategies, and then letting the students engage in interactive learning 
approaches, which enabled the students to become more involved in their own education. 
Schamber and Mahoney (2006) conducted a similar study in which students were taught to 
cultivate critical thinking skills through collaborative groups. They also found that group work 
enhanced critical thinking skills, and provided opportunities for students to assess their thought 
processes and ideas. 
 While it might seem that for interactive instruction or asynchronous learning to promote 
critical thinking, it needs to be conducted in small or manageable size classrooms.  Yang (2007) 
conducted a study to determine if critical thinking skills could still be cultivated in large 
classrooms or online. He found that indeed critical thinking skills can be taught in large 
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classrooms, and specifically that asynchronous learning was a vehicle supporting that approach. 
Also, well-developed Socratic dialogues have been demonstrated as a tool to promote critical 
thinking skills. An additional note here, Astleitner (2002) conducted a study to determine the 
effectiveness of teaching critical thinking skills online.  He found that there was no difference in 
critical thinking outcomes from either a traditional or online instruction. 
 The environment also provides a valuable asset to be considered when teaching critical 
thinking. A study conducted by Nelson Laird (2005) identified that students who were exposed 
to diversity and other various interactions demonstrate greater propensity toward critical 
thinking. Those students typically were found to be more open-minded, and therefore willing to 
exhibit greater flexibility when solving problems or understanding larger aspects of complex 
skills. Ernst and Monroe (2006) conducted a similar study on how the environment affects 
critical thinking skills and dispositions, and they arrived at a similar conclusion. Environments 
play an integral part of education, and indeed critical thinking skills can be cultivated through the 
use of incorporating the environment and aspects of it in instruction. 
 Teaching critical thinking through an understanding of student dispositions and the types 
of forums that need to be incorporated and leveraged.  Stedman and Andenoro (2007) found that 
by engaging students through critical thinking focused exercises helps develop critical thinking 
dispositions. Furthermore, a certain maturity and deeper understanding of course material may be 
accessed through developing critical thinking dispositions. Yang, Newby, and Bill (2005) found 
a similar growth in critical thinking skills through the use of Socratic questioning in instruction. 
They found the Socratic-based instruction to be especially beneficial through the use of 
asynchronous forums. Also, Duphorne and Gunawardena (2005) conducted a study on the effects 
of utilizing computer designs and organizers on critical thinking skills. They found that there was 
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no significant difference of participants that utilized the organizers compared to those that did 
not. They evaluated three different computer models that would assist in organizing data and 
problem sets, and found that none of them increased the critical thinking abilities of participants. 
 There was research that suggests there was a relationship between critical thinking skills 
and critical thinking disposition.  Facione and Facione (1997) conducted a five-year longitudinal 
study examining this relationship, and they found a low positive correlation between critical 
thinking skills and critical thinking disposition among different populations.  However, as 
Friedel, Irani, Rudd, Gallo, and Eckhardt point out, given that Facione and Facione incorporated 
a large sample size, significant correlations should be expected (2008).  Finally, it should be 
noted that effective critical thinking instruction motivates as well as incorporates critical thinking 
skills and dispositions (Facione, 1998). 
Teaching Critical Thinking 
 I think that when it comes to teaching critical thinking, we need to examine the abilities 
of teachers and how well they understand critical thinking.  Teachers should understand what 
critical thinking is, and how they can best teach it.  Also, they need to be able to recognize 
critical thinking, especially since the ultimate goal of teaching critical thinking should be to 
improve cognitive skills that may foster flexible thinking, prudent judgment, and the ability to 
reconsider relevant information. 
 Genc (2008) conducted a study looking at critical thinking dispositions between male and 
female teacher candidates. He found that females demonstrated a higher aptitude toward critical 
thinking, while their male counterparts demonstrated a greater capability toward analytical 
thinking.  I do need to point out that there was debate within the literature to whether or not 
females were better critical thinkers (Friedel, et al, 2008), but it has been an issue worth 
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consideration.  Since intelligence analysts, in the U.S. Army as well, can be either male or 
female, I think this study may provide some valuable insights to strategies toward training 
critical thinking skills through heterogeneous analytical teams.  Genc (2008) also argues that 
programs need to focus or continue to improve on teaching critical thinking in education 
programs, and focus more on specific aspects of critical thinking. Innabi and El Sheikh (2006) 
conducted a similar study targeting mathematics teachers in Jordan. They found that most 
teachers believed that they have taught critical thinking, but could not demonstrate an 
understanding of what it was. 
 Grosser and Lombard (2008) conducted a study on the development of critical thinking 
abilities and teachers. They found that newer teachers teach critical thinking skills around the 
12th grade level. However, by incorporating strategies in how to teach critical thinking, 
especially courses that are taught critical thinking in a domain-specific method, would prepare 
teachers to more effectively teach critical thinking. 
 It has been alluded to that teaching effective critical thinking can best be accomplished 
through domain-specific application. Grauerholz and Bouma-Holtrop (2003) conducted a study 
that taught a Sociology course with critical thinking applied domain-specifically. They found 
students had a deeper understanding of the context of the instruction, and aptly demonstrated 
critical thinking skills. Conversely, Solon (2007) conducted a study that generically applied 
critical thinking to an introductory Psychology course. He found there was no statistical 
difference in the psychology aptitude tests taken by the students; however, there was an increase 
in the critical thinking scores on the corresponding test taken by the students.  Davies (2006) 
looked at domain-specific applications of teaching critical thinking, as well as critical thinking as 
a stand-alone instruction and did not find any difference between them.  Davies research, similar 
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to Solon (2007), found that critical thinking skills were generic and not domain-specific in 
nature. 
 A very comprehensive study conducted by Donald Hatcher (2006) found that there was a 
significant difference in critical thinking skills when critical thinking was tailored to a domain-
specific application. He found that the groups that learned critical thinking as a stand-alone 
course did not score as well, and lacked clarity in their usage of critical thinking skills. He found 
that teaching critical thinking skills and then applying them through practice proves that domain-
specific applications of critical thinking produce far greater results. 
 As to examining critical thinking and its applicability to intelligence analysis, there were 
several studies that have looked at critical thinking and its effect on problem solving. Since 
intelligence analysis is steeped in the concept of solving problems, this is a comparable 
evaluation for the purposes of applying critical thinking to intelligence analysis. 
 Colucciello (1997) conducted a very thorough study of nursing students and their 
dispositions toward critical thinking skills. She utilized Facione’s (1990) initial Delphi Study, 
which resulted in the development of the aforementioned critical thinking framework, to develop 
her framework of skills to be tested. She found that through a domain-specific application of 
these skills, students’ critical thinking skills could be assessed individually and more thoroughly. 
She found that critical thinking skills did indeed improve through a domain-specific application 
of instruction oriented toward this framework. In her conclusion, she was able to focus on 
specific ways in which they could develop strategies to improve on areas that were deficient. 
 Sungar and Tekkaya (2006) also conducted research on problem-based learning and its 
application to critical thinking. They found that students were able to perform at high order 
thinking levels, were more collaborative in learning, and that their critical thinking skills 
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benefitted from the problem-based learning approach. While this was not a study conducted 
specifically to evaluate domain-specific application of critical thinking, it does validate the 
theory that critical thinking skills can benefit greatly from problem-based applications. 
 A study authored by my advisor that will be published in an upcoming issue of Journal of 
Agricultural Education, Dr. Friedel (in press), was conducted to determine if a specific problem 
solving method increased the critical thinking dispositions of students. What he found was that 
there was no specific method that directly related to an increase in critical thinking abilities; 
however, critical thinking dispositions benefited from problem solving instruction. Also, he 
found that participants in this study were more adept to using various problem solving 
methodologies and styles in order to come to a solution. This in itself can significantly apply to 
critical thinking, and warrants further examination. 
 The final study was specific to U.S. Army Officers and how critical thinking instruction 
has been employed successfully. Schumm, Webb, Turek, Jones, and Ballard (2006) conducted a 
study at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College on the successful usage of critical 
thinking skills and reasoning. They found that students benefited from collaborative exercises, 
student diversity, and domain-specific application of critical thinking skills. They also found that 
students performed better when instructors were prepared and delivered the context of the class 
by utilizing the aforementioned instructional strategies. Therefore, Socratic-questioning, 
diversity of students, problem-solving methods, and domain-specific applications of critical 
thinking directly impacted these officers’ ability to utilize and apply critical thinking skills. 
Summary of Critical Thinking Research 
 The aforementioned studies overwhelming highlight the value of utilizing critical 
thinking in instruction. Students benefit in the areas of providing more objective and thorough 
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solutions or answers. Also, students have been found to benefit from domain-specific 
applications of critical thinking and problem-based applications. Intelligence analysis is a very 
demanding profession, in which the determinations that analysts produce will most likely never 
be completely correct (if at all), and potentially have a direct impact on operations that effect 
U.S. policy or operations. Providing intelligence analysts the cognitive tools that can assist their 
ability to develop more objective and thorough assessments can help mitigate the chances of 
their assessments completely missing the important indicators that could potential have 
devastating consequences. 
 First, intelligence analysts should be taught critical thinking in an effective manner, one 
that will help them develop critical thinking skills, and identify them in order to benefit from 
their application. These skills should be taught overtly, where the analyst is aware of what is 
being taught, and then can recognize his own strengths and weaknesses within a specific skill-
set. 
 Next, the environment should be conducive for the analyst to effectively learn critical 
thinking. This means that classes need to be structured with diversity in students, exercises that 
are specific to the situations in which analysts find themselves, and using the tools that are 
available to them. Then analysts can learn through group collaborative efforts, that enable them 
to utilize the various knowledge and resources that the group possesses. 
 Instructors should be well versed in critical thinking terminology.  If intelligence analysts 
are to learn critical thinking, then the instructors need to not only understand critical thinking, 
but be able to cultivate classrooms and environments that help promote the usage of critical 
thinking skills and be able to effectively evaluate its usage. 
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 Critical thinking should also be taught in a domain-specific setting. While some studies 
do not specifically agree that domain-specific application of critical thinking benefit the further 
development of critical thinking skills compared to teaching critical thinking as a stand-alone 
course, it does appear in the studies that applied critical thinking as a framework to be applied 
domain-specifically that those students not only benefited, but the instructor could develop 
strategies to improve shortcomings. This benefit was definitely worth the effort of developing 
domain-specific applications of critical thinking, because student feedback and improvement was 
one impetus of critical thinking. 
 The counterinsurgency and counterterrorism environments may be very complex and 
challenging. An intelligence analyst needs to foment more versatile and agile cognitive abilities 
and problem solving techniques. The analyst needs to be able to hold multiple problems, and 
effectively evaluate indicators against the myriad of possibilities that they may apply. Therefore, 
an intelligence analyst will benefit greatly from the application of a domain-specific critical 
thinking framework that is taught effectively and specifically. 
Historical Counterinsurgencies 
 The application of a critical thinking approach to intelligence analysis was also examined 
against historically successful counterinsurgencies as well as the principles that are presently 
being studied by various agencies.  The focus of the historical studies will be on The U.S. 
Philippine War and the British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya. 
 The examination of historical counterinsurgencies was considered valuable to the study, 
because specific lessons were identified that explained how the CTIAP provided effective insight 
into operational consideration.  The CTIAP was partially developed through the experiences I 
gained over the course of my military career; these experiences reflect a larger lesson that may 
33 
 
be explored through an examination of these counterinsurgencies.  Further, it was important to 
understand how successful counterinsurgencies leverage the operational environment; one of the 
premises of the CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 2008). 
 Brian Linn’s The Philippine War, 1899-1902 provided a valuable study of the U.S. 
Philippine War that examined the successful U.S. involvement against a Filipino nationalist 
insurgency.  While Linn does discuss that the U.S. forces employed a heavy hand in the conflict, 
the more important lesson derived from this examination was how U.S. forces implemented a 
strategy that leveraged all aspects of the operational environment to defeat the insurgency while 
building trust and support from the Filipino populace. 
 The next historical study is the British counterinsurgency in Malaya.  Retired U.S. Army 
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons 
from Malaya and Vietnam is an examination of the aspects that have led to success in 
counterinsurgencies.  He also leveraged his own knowledge and experience gained from serving 
as a battalion commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 Richard Millet’s Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces 
in Latin America and the Philippines demonstrated the historical role of U.S. military forces in 
nation building post-conflict.  While Millet’s study examined both positive and negative aspects 
of the U.S. efforts at building or rebuilding a nation’s security forces, it also highlighted the 
importance of incorporating the efforts of security within the larger context of improving the 
operational environment. 
 Furthermore, two recent and viable studies argue the importance of incorporating the 
political and economic efforts with the military effort during counterinsurgencies.  Nadia 
Schadlow’s Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain, and Henry Nuzum’s Shades of 
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CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of ‘Unity of Effort’ in American Counterinsurgency were 
important arguments that need to be examined in the context of how intelligence analysts need to 
leverage and incorporate the entire operational environment into their analysis and 
considerations. 
Summary 
 This literature review contained multiple studies that were focused on effective teaching 
strategies, environmental considerations, domain-specific applications, and the usage of problem 
solving strategies to develop and refine critical thinking skills. Most of these studies found that 
students greatly benefited from the utilizing of critical thinking skills, and the strategies that were 
employed to enhance them.  
 Teaching critical thinking effectively was paramount. In order to do this, many of the 
studies found that an effective environment needs to be created for the student. This environment 
consists of diversity in the student population, ensuring that the student understand what critical 
thinking is, and that they are learning it, and exercise that promote collaboration amongst the 
student population. 
 Also, teachers need to well-versed in what critical thinking is, and how to teach it. Some 
studies demonstrated that many teachers think they know what critical thinking is, and that they 
are using it, but the studies revealed that truly they did not know what it is or understand how to 
effectively teach it. In order for students to benefit from critical thinking instruction, the teachers 
need to learn what critical thinking is, and effective strategies to employ it in the classroom. 
 There were various studies on the usage of critical thinking in domain-specific 
applications. While some found that teaching critical thinking as a stand-alone course, the 
fundamental value of critical thinking is found in those studies that applied critical thinking in a 
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domain-specific manner. Also, it was demonstrated that strategies to improve critical thinking 
skills could be found when critical thinking was applied domain-specifically by utilizing a 
specific framework for employment. 
 Finally, teaching critical thinking in a specific problem-solving methodology also 
enhances the student’s ability to utilize and understand critical thinking skills. This strategy 
along with the usage of effective environments will provide a very clear and concise example of 
how to apply critical thinking skills. It will also demonstrate the validity and benefits of learning 
critical thinking.  To date, there has not been any research studies conducted on the benefits of 
incorporating critical thinking to intelligence analysis.  Therefore, my study looked at a specific 
problem, the lack of a domain-specific application to intelligence analysis, without any previous 
literature to support it. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
 In order to explain how a domain-specific application of critical thinking to intelligence 
analysis provides a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessment, a review of 
successful counterinsurgencies will be examined.  These historical successful 
counterinsurgencies were compared to an intelligence analysis process that applied a critical 
thinking methodology that focuses the analyst to evaluate their holdings through the operational 
environment.  The intelligence analysis process utilized critical thinking in a domain-specific 
application, which means that it was tailored specifically to the functions of intelligence analysis.  
This leads to my research question:  How does a domain-specific application of critical thinking 
to intelligence analysis provide a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessment that 
may be pertinent to decision makers?   
Research Design 
 This research was conducted utilizing the case study research approach and grounded 
theory.  I began with a case study to examine the effectiveness of the domain-specific application 
of critical thinking to intelligence analysis; and then through grounded theory, I examined some 
commonalities of historical counterinsurgencies that contributed to success.  The case study 
strategy was chosen since it best examines the how and why of a research topic, and focuses on 
contemporary issues (Yin 2009).  The dependent variable for this research was the effectiveness 
of the analysis conducted by cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point using a 
critical thinking based model applied to intelligence analysis. The study examined a group of 
cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point that had been taught intelligence 
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analysis with the Critical Thinking Intelligence Analysis Process (CTIAP) (Hess & Friedel, 
2008).  The study also examined historical counterinsurgencies to examine why a domain-
specific application of critical thinking is important, and how the CTIAP (Hess & Friedel) may 
improve the objectivity, completeness, and applicability of intelligence analysis through semi-
structured interviews.   
 This study was conducted utilizing a qualitative research approach instead of a 
quantitative approach.  I chose qualitative because it was better suited to explore and understand 
how and why something works in a real-world situation.  Qualitative research is more 
interpretive in nature, and provides more depth and understanding of the interconnectedness of 
the variables rather than attempt to control or isolate them; such as the CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 
2008).  Also, quantitative research is more systematical, typically mathematically or statistically-
based, and provide validity that may be generalized to a larger population.  Given this, my 
research question was not quantitative in nature, but rather more in line with the definitions of 
qualitative research (Merriam, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Yin, 
2009). 
 I chose the case study method because it was well suited for studying real-life situations 
that involve processes and details that were not suitable for quantitative analysis (Yin, 2009; 
Merriam, 2009).  Case studies typically deal with a specific phenomenon in contemporary 
events, and this study introduced historical studies, but these historical studies were analyzed in 
relation to their importance to contemporary events (Yin; Merriam).  Furthermore, quantitative 
analysis tends to remove a specific phenomenon from its situation (Yin), and according to the 
U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) (3-24) intelligence was an essential part of 
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any counterinsurgency operation.  Therefore, the case study approach best suited the overall 
objectives of this study. 
The case study research approach provided rich insight into the interconnectedness and 
complexity of the variables for this study.  This strength of the case study approach provided the 
means to effectively evaluate the critical thinking framework applied in a domain-specific 
manner to intelligence analysis. A weakness in the case study approach is the subjective nature 
of the data collected.  This limitation was managed through a control mechanism where a group 
of experts, former battalion or brigade commanders with counterinsurgency experience, were 
asked their opinions pertaining to the objectivity, completeness, and applicability of the 
responses from the two groups in order to mitigate any flaws in the study that may reflect that the 
intelligence analysis doctrine is relatively sound, and not in need of being completely replaced.  
Rather, this study focused on examining how and why the CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 2008) 
method can improve intelligence analysis for all analysts regardless of their experience and 
meticulous attention to detail. 
  In utilizing the case study research method, I conducted ten interviews with the 
participants (five cadets and five former colonels who comprised the panel of experts).  The 
interviews focused on answering questions that pertained to how they would conduct their 
analysis based on a situation that will be presented in a case-based scenario that attempted to 
reflect a contemporary counterinsurgency.   
 The case-based scenario presented had a detailed map of the area associated to a specific 
counterinsurgency problem.  The scenario was a fictitious country that has appealed to the 
United States for assistance with an ongoing counterinsurgency.  The cadet was the primary 
intelligence analysts for a combat infantry brigade that has been deployed to support the host 
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nation with their ongoing counterinsurgency.  I then provided message traffic that detailed 
attacks conducted by the insurgents against the host nation’s infrastructure and people.  From 
this, the student built an analytical assessment detailing what the threat group(s) look like, what 
are their objectives, and what are they planning to do and when based on the Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield process found in FM (2-01.3). 
 The design included historical studies as previously mentioned.  The data analysis was 
conducted with the usage of Grounded Theory, where “the researcher begins with a[n] 
interview…and compares it with another incident…”. (Marriam, 2009, pp. 199-200)  By 
analyzing the details of the interviews, the usage of a critical thinking framework was examined 
in context of what factors contributed toward successful historical counterinsurgencies. 
 To ensure that the assessments received from the semi-structured interviews were 
focused toward successful mission accomplishment in a counterinsurgency, I utilized a panel of 
experts to ensure triangulation of the validity of the study.  Five former battalion or brigade 
commanders reviewed the findings from the interviews, and also reviewed the aspects that they 
are compared to in successful counterinsurgencies such as the U.S. Philippine War of 1899-1902 
(Linn 2000) or the British action in Malaya (Nagl 2005).  I also conducted interviews with the 
group of experts in order to compile their opinions since the case-based scenario, as with real-life 
counterinsurgencies, did not have a specific or clearly defined outcome (Yin 2009). 
Reliability and Validity of the Study 
 The reliability of this study pertains to the specific data collection procedures that I 
utilized (Yin, 2009).  Since I studied a very specific problem with a very specific population, the 
reliability of this study was very important.  The case-based scenario was a tool that I will 
utilized as the basis of the data derived through the interviews.  The CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 
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2008) was the method that the cadets utilized to solve the case-based scenario.  So for a study to 
be conducted that can replicate this one with similar results, a requirement would exist to satisfy 
all these specific items. 
 The validity of this study may be ascertained through the three following aspects: 
construct, internal, and external (Yin, 2009).  Construct validity ensures that my study is based 
on the correct measures utilized in research (Yin).  Internal validity is utilized to ensure the 
environment of the study is controlled to ensure the data obtained from the participants that are 
not corrupted by factors that I did not attempt to control (Yin).  External validity attempts to 
explain to whom the results can be applied to or generalized (Yin). 
 Because this was a qualitative research study, the aforementioned aspects of validity take 
on a different meaning in perspective to the goals of this study.  I did not believe that I would 
find an all encompassing truth through this study, but rather provide a methodology that may 
improve the intelligence analyst’s ability to provide more meaningful, objective, and specific 
recommendations that may be applied to a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism environment.  
The usage of a case-based scenario attempted to reflect a real-world insurgency that highlighted 
this challenge.  I could create thousands of case-based scenarios, and most likely none of them 
will ever adequately reflect the next counterinsurgency the United States could find itself 
engaged.  Therefore, I thought it was prudent to utilize the triangulation method that I discussed 
previously in the research design.  Triangulation may help ensure the reliability, credibility, and 
validity of the research (Merriam, 2009).  The panel of experts served as my means to ensure 
triangulation of the study. 
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Participants 
 There were five participating cadets selected from the course, Terrorism: New Challenges 
(SS465), which I taught during the Fall semester of 2010 at the United States Military Academy 
at West Point utilizing the CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 2008) method.  I ensured that all participants 
were taught the doctrinal intelligence process and CTIAP (Hess & Friedel) prior to completing 
the case-based scenario and corresponding interviews.  The interviews were semi-structured 
questions that explored how the analysts conducted their analysis of the case-based scenario (Yin 
2009).   
 The sampling strategy was nonrandom purposive sampling.  The sampling was 
nonrandom purposive because according to Gay, Mills, and Airasian (2009) purposive sampling 
“is the process of selecting a sample that is believed to be representative of a given population” 
(p. 134).  As mentioned in chapter 1, there was a finite pool of candidates that could be utilized 
for this study; therefore, I did not generalize the findings of this study to a larger population.  
 All participants were required to give their consent acknowledging participation in the 
study.  Also, approval from the military chain-of-command was obtained prior to the beginning 
of the study.  There were not any ethical standards that need addressed or approval.  The entire 
study was approved in accordance with Louisiana State University IRB policies and procedures, 
E5369. (Appendix E) 
The Case-Based Scenario 
 I utilized the case-based scenario for counterinsurgencies found in FM 34-130, and then 
wrote the message traffic, which were reports of events that had occurred during the scenario.  
The situation was one of an ongoing insurgency with various threat groups operating to 
destabilize a U.S.-friendly country.  The participants received all the operational information, 
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military maps, and message traffic associated with the situation.  The operational information 
consisted of a synopsis that discussed the history behind the conflict, the host nation response, 
and U.S. involvement.  The maps were paper-based military maps that were typically used by the 
U.S. Army.  The message traffic was information that was typically collected through various 
operations that detailed the insurgent’s operations. 
 The case-based scenario was validated through multiple exercises with qualified 
instructors at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, AZ.  These exercises were the 
instructors completing the scenarios themselves, and identifying and correcting any 
shortcomings.  All exercises that were used for the case-based scenario were pilot tested with 
another group of instructors.  The intent of the review was for content validity and clarity in the 
case-based scenario.  If any ambiguities or other constraints were identified, the case-based 
scenario would have been updated and revalidated with the same instructors.  An answer-key of 
sorts was developed that demonstrated what the threat groups were doing, and planning to do 
with detailed explanations outlining why.  The collection of this qualitative data was examined 
against the answer-key developed through the pilot test. 
 While this case-based scenario did not have any contemporary studies to compare it to in 
order to evaluate its reliability, I did compare the findings in relationship to the historical 
counterinsurgencies aforementioned for triangulation (Yin 2009).  In order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of critical thinking applied to intelligence analysis, the instrument needed to be 
reflective of what an analyst actually does.  It would have been of marginal impact in order to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of critical thinking applied domain-specifically to intelligence 
analysis if the instrument did not represent the challenges of intelligence analysis.  The 
instrument was evaluated for its trustworthiness by looking at the credibility of the data, the 
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transformability of the scenario to similar situations, and dependability of the collection 
procedures (Gay, et al, 2009). 
 The case-based scenario provided enough detail for the participants to apply the CTIAP 
(Hess & Friedel, 2008) in order to conduct their analysis.  I reviewed the analyses to determine if 
the participants were able to apply the principles of the CTIAP, which provided details as to how 
the insurgents were trying to attack the operational environment (Hess & Friedel).  Also, the 
participants were able to provide recommendations for what factors, or nodes, needed to be 
influenced in the operational environment that may lead to operational success (Hess & Friedel). 
Data Collection Procedures 
 In order to conduct this study, the following process was followed.  First, I coordinated 
with all the participants, and from there the interview timeline was established.  To ensure 
thorough and detailed responses, the participants were given the case-based scenario one day 
prior to the interview.  I utilized semi-structured interviews to ask questions pertaining to how 
they conducted their assessment, and what specific skills they utilized while conducting that 
assessment.  I conducted the semi-structured interviews in one day attempting to control 
intersession reliability.  I also directed the participants to not discuss the scenario or how they 
conducted their analysis prior to the interviews.  Because the participants were cadets at the 
United States Military Academy, they followed a strict code that states that they will not lie or 
cheat. 
 All of the participants were present in the instruction of the CTIAP, and issuance of the 
case-based scenario to ensure the environment was controlled.  Any ambiguities or confusion 
were discussed by the entire group until an overall consensus and common approach to critical 
thinking was taught and/or a complete understanding of the intelligence process was reached. 
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 I administered all of the interviews, collected, evaluated, and analyzed the data.  If there 
would have been any discrepancies, I would have had faculty members familiar with critical 
thinking, review and make a determination, but that was unnecessary, as that did not occur.  
Lastly, I conducted a member check, and reviewed the data with the participants individually so 
they could see what they did, and further I asked them if they felt more confident utilizing 
critical thinking skills, when applicable. 
Treatment of the Data 
 All information was analyzed by the researcher and evaluated in relation to its relevance 
and completeness as determined by the group of experts.  Also, the data were examined in 
context relating to the historical examples of successful counterinsurgencies.  All final 
assessments were identified in order to assess if there was a significant difference in the detailed 
level of analysis focused against a specific problem through the use of critical thinking. 
Grounded Theory 
 As previously mentioned, grounded theory was utilized to understand the findings from 
the interviews of the cadets.  The findings were compared to aspects of successful 
counterinsurgencies that explained and provided insight to the data obtain through the interviews 
(Merriam, 2009).  It has been determined that grounded theory may help the researcher 
determine meaning in a study where historical examples provide insight explaining a certain 
phenomena (Yin, 2009, Merriam, 2009).  I think this study definitely fit that description. 
 I examined both the U.S. Philippine War of 1899-1902 and British operations in Malaya 
as my historical COIN studies since they were historical examples of successful operations, 
which targeted various aspects of the operational environment.  Since the targeting of the 
operational environment was one of the premises of the CTIAP (Hess & Friedel, 2008), I 
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identified those variables and compared them to the data obtained from the interviews.  This 
added depth to the ability of the CTIAP to provide meaningful analysis that is useful for 
commanders and decision makers. 
 I used grounded theory to guide my research through understanding why the intelligence 
analyst’s assessments impact the successful accomplishment for a military operation in a 
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism environment.  I then applied grounded theory to 
understand how those assessments impacted the operational environment of a counterinsurgency 
or counterterrorism operation.  After I concluded the interviews, I evaluated all of the answers 
holistically.  I was looking for the commonalities, and outliers, pertaining to how the cadets 
determined the threat courses of action, along with recommended targets consistent with the 
process for coding.  I highlighted the key aspects of the operational environment that were 
identified from the products produced by the cadets and through the interviews.  Then I created 
clusters based on the common aspects of the analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  These clusters 
were coded according to the operational environment variable that they answered.  From these 
clusters, I examined them in relation to the historical COINs to identify common aspects of the 
operational environment contributing to successful COINs. 
Criteria for Sources 
 My sources were primary, researched-based, quantitative sources, and historical studies 
that have specific focus on counterinsurgencies. Also, these sources may provide insight to how 
critical thinking may be taught, through integrated domain-specific methods, to improve the 
ability to utilize critical thinking skills in analyzing intelligence. All of the sources, except three, 
were written within the past five years, with the oldest ones dating from 1997.  All articles were 
obtained from the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) with the exception of the 
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historical and contemporary counterinsurgency studies.  These studies on counterinsurgencies 
were obtained from the United States Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle 
Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, or the United States Army’s Combined Arms Center’s Combat 
Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and others are books published by historians or 
authorities in counterinsurgencies.  I think these studies provided more insight into the aspects of 
why the counterinsurgency operations were successful, and were more specific to the focus of 
this study. 
 I chose the U.S. Philippine War of 1899-1902 and British operations in Malaya as my 
historical COIN studies because it was determined that they provided valuable insight into the 
factors that may lead to success in a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operation.  Both 
examples were relevant in terms of applicability pertaining to how the United States conducts 
warfare in terms of structure and civilian governmental oversight.  They also demonstrate how 
the counterinsurgent forces learned and successfully evolved their tactics during an insurgency.  I 
did not include counterinsurgencies that were not successful because the intent of this research 
was to identify the variables that contribute to successfully counterinsurgencies. 
Researcher’s Lens 
 I am very familiar with the field of intelligence analysis.  I have over nineteen years of 
active duty military service, fifteen as an intelligence analyst.  I am a senior military intelligence 
warrant officer, and have served in various positions throughout the intelligence community and 
in diverse situations during real-world deployments. 
 I enlisted in the United States Army in March of 1992.  I was eighteen years old and had 
just completed one year of college.  I enlisted as an infantryman, completed basic military 
training, advanced individual training for military occupational specialty (MOS) 11B (Infantry), 
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and then basic airborne school prior to being stationed at my first assignment with the 1st 
Battalion, 509th Airborne Infantry Regiment of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).   
 I served as a member of the Opposing Forces at the JRTC for four years as an 
infantryman.  The JRTC trains United States military units and their allies in a realistic scenario-
based exercise that examines a unit’s ability to conduct its wartime mission.  This assignment 
provided me with the foundation and desire to constantly seek ways to improve military tactics 
that can best accomplish the assigned mission.  While assigned to the JRTC, I also served as a 
member of the Scout Platoon for the 1st Battalion, 509th Airborne Infantry Regiment.  As a 
member of the Scout Platoon, my missions routinely were focused toward intelligence collection 
that would enable the main effort units to successful achieve their objectives.  This experience 
influenced my decision to become an intelligence analyst in the Military Intelligence Corps. 
 In 1996, after completing the Intelligence Analyst course (MOS 96B – now 35F), I was 
assigned to the 7th Corps Support Group in Bamberg, Germany.  During this three year tour in 
Germany, I deployed in support of the ongoing missions in the Balkans three times for a 
combined two years.  My first deployment was to Taszar, Hungary, where I served as the senior 
intelligence analyst providing route analysis for units deploying and redeploying from Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
 My second deployment took was to Slavonski Brod, Croatia, where I served as the senior 
intelligence advisor for Task Force Pershing.  My responsibilities ranged from studying the 
returning displaced persons, evacuees, and refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina to providing 
intelligence support observing the withdrawal of the Yugoslavian National Army from Eastern 
Slavonia in Croatia back into Serbia. 
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 My third deployment to the Balkans was to Albania, where I was a part of Task Force 
Hawk in Operation Noble Anvil.  I was responsible for assessing the effects of the Task Force’s 
targeting campaign, the air defense threat against coalition aircraft, and ran the interrogation of 
prisoners of war cell that interrogated two captured Yugoslavian Army Soldiers.   
 After my tour in Germany, I was reassigned to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, 
NC.  While assigned to the 82d Airborne Division, I served as the senior intelligence advisor in 
the 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry.  I participated in multiple war games and exercises while 
stationed at Fort Bragg, and was admitted into the Sergeant Audie Murphie Club for excellence 
as a Non-Commissioned Officer and leader. 
 In 2001, after being selected as a MOS 350F All-Source Intelligence Technician, I 
attended the Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Rucker, AL.  Upon graduation as a 
Warrant Officer, I attended the All-Source Intelligence Technician Basic Course at Fort 
Huachuca, AZ.  According to FM 7-0, a warrant officer is an officer that is tactically and 
technically competent in a specific field.  They also serve as advisors to commanders inherent in 
their field of expertise, while providing development, guidance, and counseling to officers, non-
commissioned officers, and Army civilians. 
 After completion of all requisite warrant officer training, I was assigned to the 2d 
Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk, LA.  I served as the Analysis and Control Element 
(ACE) Chief for the Regiment, where I was responsible for all fusion and analysis of intelligence 
in order to support the commander’s requirements.  While assigned to the 2d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, I deployed to Baghdad, Al-Kut, Al-Hillah, and An Najaf, Iraq in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. 
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 Upon return from Iraq, I became an Observer/Controller at JRTC where I was responsible 
for training units and evaluating their policies and procedures as they would prepare for 
upcoming deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan.  As a part of my duties within this position, I also 
worked with the 1st Battalion, 509th Airborne Infantry Regiment in order to ensure a realistic 
threat was reflected in the training so the rotating units could experience how the insurgents in 
Iraq or Afghanistan fight against U.S. and coalition forces. 
 In August of 2005, I was reassigned to the United States Intelligence Center at Fort 
Huachuca, AZ.  There I was selected to serve as a Small Group Instructor for the Military 
Intelligence Captains’ Career Course, where I taught Military Intelligence Captains the requisite 
skills and knowledge of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Collection Management, and 
Intelligence Analysis.  In April of 2007, I was selected to lead the 111th Military Intelligence 
Brigade’s, the unit charged with executing the training mission for the U.S. Army Intelligence 
Center, main effort – The Enlisted Analyst Training Committee (EATC).  As the committee 
chief for the EATC, I was responsible for the curriculum and training of over 2,000 intelligence 
analysts annually.  I was also responsible for the professional development of over 150 
instructors (military and civilian). 
 In August of 2009, I was reassigned to The United States Military Academy at West 
Point.  I served as the Senior Intelligence Officer and as an Instructor.  I taught the gateway 
course into the terrorism studies program, Terrorism: New Challenges (SS465), which is offered 
in the department of social sciences and is a requisite course towards a minor in Terrorism 
Studies that is offered at West Point. 
 As of July 2011, I was reassigned to the Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division at Fort 
Bragg, NC.  I am currently the Intelligence Fusion Chief in the Analysis Control Element (ACE), 
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which is part of the G-2 (Intelligence) section.  The division headquarters is preparing for a year-
long deployment in Afghanistan. 
My Philosophy of Intelligence Analysis 
 I strongly believe that intelligence is supposed to drive operations.  This means that any 
operation should only be conducted when there is a high degree of certainty that there is a 
situation that deserves attention through some type of operation, whether military or other .  I 
believe that operations that are conducted without intelligence providing the impetus for them 
are not effective and potentially put people’s lives at risk for little or no reason.  A fairly recent 
example is, in 2004 operations were conducted in Sadr City, Baghdad, Iraq.  These operations 
were focused on shutting down the Hawza newspaper, which was essentially controlled by anti-
American cleric, Muqtada Sadr, and closing The Sadr Bureau, a local administrative office that 
also served as a mosque.  The outcome of these operations provided Muqtada Sadr a platform for 
his anti-American rhetoric, and also served to polarize some of the Shi’a population against 
coalition efforts. 
I believe that intelligence analysis is the most crucial aspect of the intelligence 
warfighting function.  Without sound analysis that applies important information in context, 
there is little doubt in my mind that any operation that is conducted with poor or limited 
intelligence will yield little positive results.  The previous example serves as a good example of 
an operation that needed sound analysis conducted in order to understand possible outcomes 
prior to execution. 
I also believe that for intelligence analysis to be effective, it needs to be objective and 
thorough in its assessment.  Intelligence analysis should provide the commander enough detailed 
information that answers the 5Ws (who, what, when, where, and why or how), and if all that 
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information is not available then the analyst needs to highlight that in his assessment.  I believe 
that focused analysis leads to focused operations, and in a COIN environment that is paramount.  
Since I believe that intelligence is so important in a COIN environment, I also believe that we 
need to spend the time to conduct thorough analysis taking into account all the variables of the 
operational environment.  The only deviation from this should be for a time-sensitive situation, 
such as if we have vague information about a car bomb that is about to explode near a highly 
populated area of a town. 
I also agree that the military is an instrument of foreign policy.  Therefore, if the people 
of the United States feel strongly enough about a certain situation as to deploy the military 
instrument of policy, then the intelligence community has an inherent role to provide the best 
assessments possible for the success of the mission and safeguarding of American resources. 
Summary 
 In summary, a diverse group of cadets that have been trained in intelligence analysis were 
assessed on how well they could solve a complex problem given exposure to a critical thinking 
framework that has been applied to intelligence analysis.  The research design utilized case-study 
research that examined the conceptual framework known as CTIAP that I co-developed (Hess & 
Friedel, 2008).  The CTIAP model was evaluated through a case-based scenario that examined 
how well the participants conducted their analysis through exposure to CTIAP, and then 
compared to historical COINs utilizing grounded theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
 
 My research question for the study was: How does a domain-specific application of 
critical thinking to intelligence analysis provide a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased 
assessment that is pertinent to decision makers?   
 In order to explain how well critical thinking improves the holistic, comprehensive, and 
non-biased assessment of intelligence analysis, I presented a case-based scenario to five 
participants (cadets at the United States Military Academy) trained to use the CTIAP, and then 
conducted interviews with the cadets in order to answer my research question.  I then presented 
the products resulting from the participants’ analysis to a panel of experts consisting of five 
colonels.  After their review, I conducted independent interviews with the colonels that have 
served in a capacity to provide insight and potential critiques to the study.  Finally, I conducted a 
review of historical counterinsurgencies in order to provide a theoretical underpin regarding 
successful counterinsurgencies.  This leads to the four major sections in which I presented the 
data; 1) Cadets’ responses pertaining to using the CTIAP in the case-based scenario, 2) Panel of 
experts’ responses of the cadets’ products and analysis, 3) Historical counterinsurgencies 
providing insight to the effectiveness of the CTIAP, and 4) Review of cadets’ products and 
analysis based on historical counterinsurgencies. 
 The research methodologies that were used for this study were case-study and grounded 
theory.  According to Yin (2009) and Merriam (2009), case-study and grounded theory provide 
the best means to understand the depth of how and why the CTIAP process improves intelligence 
analysis in a COIN or counter-terror environment.  I also felt that these methods were most 
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appropriate due to the qualitative nature of the research question. The case-study method 
provided me the ability to explore the interconnectedness and complexity of the variables being 
researched; while the grounded theory method allowed me to analyze the CTIAP through 
historical counterinsurgencies that have proven to be successful. 
 The specific manner in which I utilized the case-study method was through a case-based 
scenario and semi-structured interviews with the cadets.  I utilized the case-based scenario as a 
means to replicate a realistic counterinsurgency that the cadets would analyze through the 
CTIAP.  The interviews were conducted to explore why the cadets produced the products that 
they utilized for their analysis.  After I completed the interviews with the cadets, I then 
conducted semi-structured interviews with the panel of experts in order to gain insight on their 
opinions as to why the CTIAP improves analysis.  This was done in order to allow the panel of 
experts to review the cadets’ products as if they were the commanders of a unit in the scenario, 
and for the panel to relate the usefulness of the cadets’ analysis and products in driving 
subsequent operations.  The data was presented, interpreted, and then explained for each topic. 
 The usage of grounded theory allowed me to explore successful historical 
counterinsurgencies and what commonalities can be extracted in order to understand how the 
CTIAP improves the intelligence analyst’s abilities to provide holistic, comprehensive, and non-
biased assessments.  The U.S. Philippines War and British Malaya Emergency are examples of 
successful counterinsurgencies, and exploring the major themes of success was very important 
for an understanding of how intelligence can lead to success against an insurgency.  I also 
included questions in the interviews that were conducted with both the cadets and the panel of 
experts that assisted in highlighted the themes that were identified through the examination of 
these successful counterinsurgencies.  
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Review of the Critical Thinking Intelligence Analysis Process (CTIAP) 
 The CTIAP was a framework that was built from the research of Dr. Peter Facione 
(2007).  Facione conducted a Delphi study in order to formulate a consensus definition of critical 
thinking, and also to identify the cognitive skills that were essential for good critical thinking 
skills.  The six cognitive skills that Facione identified are interpretation, analysis, evaluation, 
inference, explanation, and self-regulation (2007). The CTIAP framework focuses the analyst 
from the very beginning of the IPB process.  Essentially, step one and two of IPB are fused 
together to identify all potential consideration of the battlefield through the study of the 
operational environment (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  This then provides the analyst the ability to 
focus his analysis on any potential threat group or other entity that needs consideration pertaining 
to the way they conduct operations, and the potential areas that these groups need to influence 
(Hess & Friedel).  Based on this analysis, the analyst can begin to provide predictive analysis 
based on those areas that are specific to the groups in question (Hess & Friedel).  This process 
would then essentially provide a basis for a collection plan that the analyst can focus specifically 
to each group in question (Hess & Friedel). 
 Finally, the CTIAP framework provides the analyst the ability to effect the operational 
environment in which he is operating.  As he identifies the areas or targets that a potential group 
needs to affect, the analyst can identify the corresponding factors that are effect the overall 
operational environment.  This model may also provide the analyst the ability to assess the 
effectiveness of the operations that were and are being conducted. 
 The significance of the CTIAP process was that it has the potential to improve the way 
intelligence analysts are trained, and enhance their analysis.  Too often analysts believe that they 
may not really be providing analysis or truly solving problems.  Rather, it seems there was a 
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growing feeling from intelligence analysts that they were considered glorified reporters that have 
access to classified information (Johnston 2005).  The CTIAP process, if utilized, may help the 
analyst build a product that not only focuses analysis, but also focused on providing a 
comprehensive and systematic way to make that analysis predictive in nature (Hess & Friedel, 
2008). 
Cadets’ Responses Pertaining to Using the CTIAP 
 In order to fully understanding the depth of the data collected in interviews, I have 
evaluated the cadets’ responses and products through five major themes: 1) Understanding the 
Operational Environment, 2) Familiarization with the threat groups present in the case-based 
scenario, 3) Details and completeness with the threat courses of action, 4) Comprehensive target 
list, and 5) Ease and comfort of using CTIAP. 
 The findings of my study were arranged by the five themes aforementioned.  For each 
theme, I further broke down the respondents’ answers specific to each point.  All of the 
subsections were organized using the following format, an explanation of how that specific 
subsection builds to a holistic assessment, the cadets’ responses that provide details on how the 
CTIAP ensured their products and analysis were comprehensive, and finally a summation for 
each subsection where I explain how the cadets’ answers based on the CTIAP ensured that they 
remained objective and unbiased as possible. 
Understanding the Operational Environment   
When an intelligence analyst begins the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) 
process, defining the battlefield environment or operational environment as it may now be more 
commonly known, was the first substantial step that the analyst conducted.  The CTIAP 
organizes this step by combining both the geopolitical environment defined by the acronym 
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PMESII (Political, Military, Economy, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) with the physical 
environment defined by the acronym ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, 
People, and Events). 
 Reference to the first theme, Understanding the Operational Environment, my analysis 
focuses on both the participants’ answers during the semi-structured interviews and an evaluation 
of the products that they produced.  I conducted the analysis of their products, but I did so in 
context of what a doctrinal correct product was supposed to look like in relation to what the 
instructions were for utilizing the CTIAP. 
 Responses and my interpretation of their products were based on the following four 
discussions:  1) What did you utilize to understand the operational environment, 2) Explain how 
you derived the nodes for the insurgent groups, 3) Did the cadets produce a product that 
demonstrated their understanding of the CTIAP process in regards to detailing the operational 
environment, and 4) Cadets’ response to favorability with utilizing the CTIAP in order to 
understand the operational environment. 
Holistic evaluation of understanding the operational environment.  The first major 
step the cadets performed was an evaluation of the operational environment of the case-based 
scenario; Counterinsurgency Operations. When utilizing the CTIAP, the evaluation of the 
operational environment was accomplished through building an interface of the geopolitical and 
physical environments.  This interface was built with the PMESII/ASCOPE process (Appendix 
A).   
 The interface was holistic in its evaluation of the operational environment, because the 
cadets were required to fill the interface out with all available information in a cross-referenced 
format.  This helps ensure that the information provided was as detailed as possible based on 
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available information, and that its relative worth was evaluative as the specific aspects of the 
environment that affected the local populace, insurgents, political leaders, or otherwise could be 
ascertained. 
Cadets’ utilization of PMESII/ASCOPE.  All cadets responded that they utilized the 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface that was taught to them as a component of CTIAP.  They all felt that 
it was easy to use, and was a tremendous aid to their analysis, especially since most felt that they 
were novices when it came to intelligence analysis. 
 One cadet related that he felt that since typically there are more urban areas in a 
counterinsurgency, the PMESII/ASCOPE interface provided the necessary details to help him 
visualize the battlefield.  He stated that it was “…as if the town was highlighted and jumping out 
at me”.  Another cadet responded that the PMESII/ASCOPE interface “…just made sense, and 
seemed perfectly logical”. 
 The reason for the logical simplicity that the cadets experienced through utilizing the 
ASCOPE/PMESII interface was that it was intentionally built as a simple step-by-step method 
for analysis.  The ASCOPE acronym immediately focuses the analyst on the urban terrain in 
which he is operating.  The PMESII acronym focuses the analyst on the geo-political 
environment.  By combining them into a single product, the analyst is studying the geo-political 
environment in the context of the physical terrain he is operating in. 
Deriving the nodes for insurgent groups.  The cadets’ responses were not all the same 
when it came to explaining how they derived the nodes or objectives for the insurgent groups 
from the case-based scenario.  However, they were all similar in that they were focused on the 
operational environment of the scenario.  There were two major themes that can be derived from 
the cadets’ response, identifying threat nodes and identifying civil considerations.   
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 The two respondents that focused on threat nodes were specific in that they were trying to 
identify what the insurgent groups needed to target or influence in order to further their goals.  In 
doing so, they utilized their PMESII/ASCOPE interface, and highlighted all aspects that the 
insurgents need to influence based on the stated and assumed objectives of the insurgents. 
 The two respondents that focused on civil considerations were focusing their efforts on 
understanding and identifying what they believed to be the center of gravity in the insurgents’ 
objectives: influencing the civilian population, and trying to win their support.  While they 
focused on civil considerations, they also did indeed utilize PMESII to identify the relationship 
between the civilian population and all the other aspects of the operational environment. 
 The fifth respondent focused his efforts toward identifying all potential links of every 
aspect of the operational environment in a very holistic nature.  While this was not in itself a bad 
thing, it would take additional effort to identify specific objectives that a specific insurgent group 
would target.  In practice, what the fifth cadet did was attempt to ascertain which areas within 
each variable of the ASCOPE/PMESII interface that the insurgents would need to influence 
without identifying areas that the insurgents would not need to influence, at least in his 
interpretation.  The problem that may arise in this type of analysis was that the analyst can easily 
miss indicators or potential interconnectedness between insurgent objectives and aspects of the 
operational environment that the local populace relies upon. 
 Pertaining to how the cadets identified the potential threat nodes, all respondents 
followed the basic premises of the CTIAP.  Whether the focus was on the insurgents, the civil 
considerations, or an identification of all potential links, the analysis was sound and worthwhile.  
The best way to conduct this analysis was truly dependent on the individual and the situation one 
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finds himself in, but the more specificity that can be built into the product; the more useful the 
analysis will be when applied. 
Detailing the operational environment.  All of the cadets produced a product that 
resembled the PMESII/ASCOPE interface from the CTIAP, example found in Appendix A.  
They were all detailed and potentially useful for purpose of building sound threat models, which 
leads to specific courses of action and deliberate target nominations.  Overall, the cadets 
demonstrated an understanding of the process and produced relevant products. 
 The cadets were able to produce products that highlighted all the known areas of the 
operational environment that could potentially be significant to both the populace and the 
insurgents.  The identification of political areas, military and law enforcement, governmental 
structures and organizations, and areas of economic importance are just a few examples.  The 
interface provides a detailed understanding of the operational environment for the analyst to 
apply for the purposes of benefit to the populace and areas that need to be influenced or 
controlled to deny the insurgents a capability. 
Cadets’ favorability towards utilizing the CTIAP.  For each major subsection of the 
study, I asked the cadets about their favorability with utilizing the CTIAP.  In regards to their 
favorability with the CTIAP and understanding the operational environment, all respondents 
reported high favorability.  They all felt that it was much more useful and meaningful than the 
doctrinal process of Understanding the Environment (Step 2 of IPB). 
 Specifically, as they expanded on their responses, the cadets reported that the CTIAP 
process in relation to understanding the operational environment was “multidimensional”, “well-
rounded”, “easy to use”, and “organized”.  One cadet mentioned that the PMESII/ASCOPE 
interface created an almost three dimensional understanding of the battlefield without any 
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visualization aids.  The three dimensional visualization of the battlefield analogy makes sense, as 
the ASCOPE/PMESII interface enables an analyst to examine all of the aspects of the 
operational environment simultaneously through a physical terrain and geo-political lens.  
Another cadet mentioned that he could never understand why someone would not use the 
process.  The responses were consistent in that they felt that the CTIAP should be the U.S. 
Army’s doctrinal process when it comes to understanding the operational environment.  The 
cadets felt that the current doctrinal process was not specific or detailed enough for COIN or 
counterterrorism operations, but the CTIAP does provide the requisite details for both 
environments.  This was not an uncommon sentiment among analysts, because current doctrine 
was not developed with the specificity for all potential environments, but rather as a framework 
that needs to be applied to certain situations.  This aspect was one reason why I it works well 
with a critical thinking framework; because existing doctrine has enough flexibility to apply it 
with relative ease. 
Summary of understanding the operational environment.  Based on the cadets’ 
responses, they believe they built an objective and relatively bias-free interface of PMESII and 
ASCOPE.  Since it appears that they did utilize the information from the case-based scenario as 
it was presented to them, and did not infer anything into their analysis that was not present, that 
they were successful at maintaining an objective analytical product. 
 It also appears that the main catalyst for their success with maintaining objectivity and 
bias-free analysis was indeed the CTIAP.  The cadets demonstrated objectivity and bias-free 
analysis through the PMESII/ASCOPE interface, since the data presented were not subject to 
interpretation, but rather organized in a logical and meaningful manner.  The cadets essentially 
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responded to that assumption when they felt that they understood and utilized the CTIAP for 
their ASCOPE/PMESII interface. 
Familiarization with the Threat Groups 
The second theme pertaining to the cadets’ responses to the case-based scenario was 
familiarization with the threat groups.  In order to determine if the respondents were familiar 
with the threat groups of the case-based scenario, again some major themes surfaced in the 
responses from the cadets, they are: 1) Identification of threat groups, 2) Identification of threat 
tactics, 3) Ability to build a threat model, 4) An explanation of how the tactics of the insurgent 
groups focused analysis, and 5) Cadets’ response to favorability with CTIAP in order to 
familiarize themselves with the threat groups present in the case-based scenario. 
Holistic evaluation of familiarization with threat groups.  Similarly to my assessment 
of cadets’ evaluation of the operational environment, these five cadets were able to understand 
the CTIAP’s methodology when it came to evaluating threat groups.  All of the cadets were able 
to determine what each group looked like, given the information in the case-based scenario, and 
built upon the information present in their PMESII/ASCOPE interface.  They presented a 
coherent picture of the insurgent groups’ capabilities, basic tactics, potential objectives, and 
limitations.  This demonstrated that the cadets understood the holistic nature of understanding the 
operational environment and its aspects that were important to the insurgents, and in turn 
important to the U.S. forces.   
 The products that the cadets produced were specific enough to demonstrate that they 
could categorically identify indicators pertaining to one insurgent group vice the other one.  
Also, they were able to ascertain specific threat models that highlighted the potential objectives 
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that the insurgents would most probably attempt to influence.  This understanding demonstrates 
that the cadets realize the interconnectedness of the CTIAP and the information that it derives.   
Identification of threat groups.  All five cadets were able to identify the two major 
insurgent groups present in the case-based scenario, and also made mention of individuals that 
could be potential threats.  More importantly, all five cadets were able to associate specific 
objectives to each insurgent group.  This identification helped ensure that their 
PMESII/ASCOPE was built specifically to each insurgent group.  Interestingly, the one cadet 
who built his PMESII/ASCOPE interface based on all of the links he developed in his analysis, 
and then went back and updated his analysis to identify the links specific to each insurgent 
group.  In other words, the cadet essentially reverse engineered his analysis of the insurgent 
groups.  His effort was focused on identifying the potential objectives that the insurgents would 
like to influence, and then conducted his nodal analysis of the operational environment in order 
to understand how the variables were related to those objectives.  During the interview with this 
cadet, I asked him why he preferred to reverse engineer his analysis, and he responded that 
“…developing actionable intelligence is more important time-wise than understanding the 
relationships of each insurgent group and their potential objectives”.  The cadet’s answer was not 
wrong, but it could be misleading.  By not understanding the interconnectedness of insurgents 
and their objectives in relation to their end state, the intelligence analyst may be providing 
actionable intelligence that was not relevant or could exacerbate another situation. 
 Cadets often found it preferable (as it was taught to them) to build the PMESII/ASCOPE 
interface specifically to each threat group from the beginning, as it can be modified as the analyst 
continues moving through the process.  However, it was recommended to make it a habit of 
focusing specific analysis from the beginning, as an analyst can easily become rushed for time 
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and potentially forgetting or become overcome and never update the PMESII/ASCOPE interface.  
This specific analysis would identify those nodes that the insurgents would attempt to 
manipulate, and from there build the threat models that identify objectives. 
Identification of threat tactics.  When asking the cadets how they identified the tactics 
of the insurgent groups in the case-based scenario, I received one consistent answer – the 
operational environment.  This answer highlights the point that the nodes that are identified 
through the evaluation of the operational environment with the PMESII/ASCOPE interface 
provide insight into the objectives that the insurgents would need to influence.   
 Specifically, the cadets provided more specificity in their answers.  Three of the cadets 
reported that the operational environment provided them the ability to conduct detailed analysis.  
One cadet reported that he had a “better understanding of the insurgents’ objectives”, which 
provided him “…the details necessary to understand the insurgents’ tactics and goals”.  Another 
cadet mentioned that he liked the interface as it provided him a methodology of determining 
“insurgent targets, resources, and infrastructure”.  The other two cadets reported that they were 
able to ascertain the “nodes that we need to impact”, “links and connections”, and “non-lethal 
aspects” for consideration.  All answers were within those two major observations, and were 
indeed focused through their PMESII/ASCOPE interface. 
 The responses were very important for the intelligence analyst to understand, as the 
operational environment provides aspects for the analyst to separate the insurgents from the 
population.  When the intelligence analyst can identify specific objectives or areas within the 
operational environment that the insurgents need to control in order to be successful, it provides 
the analyst the ability to focus collection and operations in order to deny the insurgents those 
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areas.  This information may also assist in identifying indicators to find the insurgents as they 
attempt to conduct reconnaissance or other preliminary operations against those objectives.   
Ability to build a threat model.  All of the cadets built threat models depicting how they 
believed the enemy conducted attacks against a specific objective.  These objectives were all 
derived from the nodes that were identified through their PMESII/ASCOPE interface, and 
specific to each insurgent group.   
 The cadets felt that they had a good idea of how the insurgent groups would conduct the 
attacks against the objectives based on the analysis conducted of the operational environment.  
The cadets were also able to identify the weapon systems available to the insurgents, and built 
vignettes on how those objectives would be attacked according to the capabilities of the weapon 
systems. 
 All five cadets produced valid threat models, and provided substantive data to support the 
objectives that were utilized (Appendices C & D).  While a threat model was not a course of 
action, it does demonstrate that the cadets were able to ascertain one insurgent group’s signature 
of a specific attack versus a different insurgent group.  This was important, as it demonstrates the 
ability to recognize the signatures present when there may be more than one threat group 
operating in a single environment.  
An explanation of how the tactics of the insurgent groups focused analysis.  At first 
the cadets had a hard time understanding how the insurgents’ tactics focused their analysis.  
However, as the cadets began to explain what they produced and why, I found that they quickly 
realized that the tactics employed by the insurgents did have a significant impact on how they 
conducted their analysis.  The products the cadets produced were specific to each insurgent 
group at this point, and the result was that they had different products for both insurgent groups. 
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 For instance, a product known as a link diagram was produced to demonstrate 
relationships between people and events.  Both insurgent groups had enough information to build 
a link diagram, but what the cadets found was that they needed to build three different diagrams 
to fully realize the complexity of the insurgent groups.  The cadets built one link diagram for 
each group, and four of them produced a third diagram to highlight potential relationships 
outside of the groups, whether to the other insurgent group or civil organizations.  While there 
was not an established doctrinal process to build additional diagrams for external relationships, 
what the cadets realized was that an insurgent group has far reaching arms where some of the 
members operate in licit and sanctioned careers (Appendices C & D).  The interesting finding 
was that the fifth cadet did not produce an additional link diagram, but still made note of this 
challenge through an explanation or white paper discussing this paradigm (Appendix D).  
Cadets’ response to favorability with CTIAP.  As was the case with the cadets’ 
responses to the CTIAP toward the operational environment, the cadets were likewise very 
favorable of the CTIAP in relation to the details that they were able to produce for the threat 
groups.  All of the cadets reported that they found the CTIAP an easy way to organize their 
thoughts, and found it very useful when trying to establish a system that would help them 
identify who was responsible for any specific attack or other reporting. 
 All of the cadets felt that the ability to organize the threat model through the CTIAP 
helped them determine and understand how they can recognize indicators of a specific group.  
By understanding and recognizing the indicators, the cadets began to speculate that they would 
be able to have more focused collection against the insurgents, and potentially nominate more 
meaningful targets (lethal and non-lethal).  One cadet commented that “…I guess the things that 
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I don’t know should be what I task [collectors] first”, and another cadet mentioned “…this tells 
me how to find the insurgents”. 
 The cadets demonstrated that they understood the value of building a threat model for all 
of the insurgents present in the case-based scenario.  Their comments provide insight into two 
specific aspects of the CTIAP that maintain focus for the intelligence analyst; identifying and 
collecting on intelligence gaps, and focusing collection on indicators.  The intelligence gaps were 
important to collect against, because the more we understand the operational environment, the 
more we can understand the relationships between the geo-political environment and the 
insurgents’ goals.  The indicators were important because they provide opportunities to find and 
then capture or kill the insurgents, or they provide a means for the counterinsurgent forces to 
influence the populace favorably in order to remove the insurgents’ influence. 
Summary of familiarization with the threat groups.  As the above discussion 
demonstrates, the cadets were able to produce the requisite products that the CTIAP facilitates 
(as well as doctrine dictates).  These products, which all inclusively are defined as the threat 
model, are the link diagrams, pattern analysis, doctrinal templates, and insurgent order of battle 
workbooks.  The value of these products were that they provide a framework relating to the 
organizational, geographical, and warfighting capabilities (and limitations) of the insurgent 
groups.  This was important for an intelligence analyst to understand, as it focuses the efforts of 
the analyst as he prepares to build the predictive threat courses of action. 
 The cadets demonstrated that they could produce all these products to a high level of 
proficiency.  The products were detailed enough that they would benefit the cadets as they 
proceeded to build their courses of action.  The cadets demonstrated that they had familiarity 
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with the insurgent groups, and could recognize specific indicators that are indicative of one 
insurgent group versus the other. 
Details and Completeness with Threat Courses of Action 
 The third theme of the interviews conducted with the cadets that participated in the case-
based scenario is the details and completeness with the threat courses of action.  This section 
focuses on the ability to produce predictive courses of action based on the templates that the 
cadets had produced to this point.  I have identified the following five themes from the 
interviews with the cadets, 1) How were the previous products utilized to prepare the courses of 
action, 2) How were the objectives validated through you analysis, 3) What criteria did you 
establish for evaluating reporting, 4) What did you use to focus your collection efforts, and 5) 
Cadets’ response to favorability of utilizing the CTIAP when preparing threat courses of action. 
Holistic evaluation of details and completeness with the threat courses of action.  As 
noted in my summary of the threat model section, the cadets understood the value of the 
information that they previously produced and its relationship to building threat courses of 
action.  As demonstrated with the following data, the cadets produced detailed courses of action 
that were specific to each insurgent group.  Also, they typically recognized the fluidity of the 
battlefield, as they demonstrated the ability to build branches and sequels within their courses of 
action in the event the specific insurgent group modified or deviated during the operation (or if 
the course of action itself was not completely correct in its presentation of the operation). 
 The cadets continued to utilize their PMESII/ASCOPE interface, as well as to update it 
based on additional information, to focus their analysis toward the potential objectives and areas 
that were important for the conduct of both the insurgents and the U.S. forces’ missions.  Also, it 
was apparent that the threat model products were used according to their function, as the courses 
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of action provided details pertaining to time and organization.  This demonstrates that the cadets 
continued to understand the holistic concept set forth through the CTIAP, and they were 
furthermore able to apply that information in a useable and meaningful way. 
Products utilized to prepare the courses of action.  All of the cadets reported that they 
utilized the products that they had prepared prior to developing the threat courses of action.  
They further responded that they believed that developing the courses of action proved to be 
quite simplified through the utilization of the products.  One cadet responded, “Why wouldn’t 
you use them?”  This cadet’s response, while simplistic, demonstrated an understanding of how 
important it is to constantly update your data based on new information.  If an intelligence 
analyst was not using his previously produced products, then he would not even bother to 
continuously update them.  When the analytical products are not used, then the analyst is simply 
guessing as to what the insurgents are trying to achieve, and he is not identifying indicators in 
order to find them. 
 As to how they used them, the general answer was the previously developed products 
provided the details that the cadets needed to build the threat courses of action.  Furthermore, 
they reported that by leveraging the products they had developed, they felt that they could more 
accurately assess the quality of reporting.  The reports they would receive provides information 
that helps confirm, deny, or requires updating of the courses of action, and the ability to evaluate 
them was recognized as of paramount importance (it is also part of the CTIAP). 
Validating objectives through analysis.  The cadets responded that they were able to 
identify the potential objectives that facilitated course of action development through the 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface and the threat models produced.  By identifying those objectives, the 
cadets felt that their courses of action provided detailed locations that U.S. forces could collect 
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against in order to confirm the course of action or otherwise.  Through utilizing their threat 
models, the cadets were able to draw conclusions on where insurgents would have to position 
themselves based on the capabilities and limitations of their weapon systems and other assets 
(Appendix C). 
 The cadets seemed to believe that the validity of the objectives was an issue of great 
difficulty.  In order to thoroughly validate the objectives, they would need some collection that 
confirms or denies the course of action.  However, they did recognize that they could leverage 
additional information from their PMESII/ASCOPE interface that provides potential key events, 
which aided their confidence in assessing the potential objectives. 
Criteria for establishing and evaluating reporting.  All of the cadets reported that they 
established the basis for evaluating their reporting prior to developing courses of action.  They all 
utilized the concept brought forward through the CTIAP, which was to establish a numerical 
evaluative process based on the source of the reports.  Specifically, one cadet mentioned that he 
“…used a 1 to 5 scale based on the reliability of the source”.  The CTIAP proposes that the 
intelligence analyst should develop a numerical scale, and it provides a 1 to 5 scale based on the 
sources of data, to evaluate the credibility of each report.  The CTIAP also addresses how to 
build this scale for each intelligence discipline, as each discipline is unique and therefore 
consideration for building a scale to establish credibility should be determined prior to 
conducting analysis. 
 All of the cadets appeared to be comfortable with the evaluative process from the CTIAP.  
One cadet specifically asked, “How do Soldiers currently evaluate the reports they receive?”  
This cadet’s question was rather difficult to answer, because based on my experience; this was 
not being done by the majority of intelligence analysts in the Army.  Also, current doctrine does 
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not specifically call for an evaluative process to determine credibility of the information.  The 
CTIAP provides examples, and the cadets’ comments demonstrate that there should be a 
methodology to establish credibility of information. 
Focus on collection efforts.  The cadets stated that the primary focus for their collection 
efforts was based on confirming the insurgent groups’ objectives that defined the threat courses 
of action.  They believed that if they could identify the objectives, then the opportunity for 
successfully combating the insurgents would greatly improve.  They also believed that through 
identifying the objectives, they could confirm or deny the overall courses of action (Appendices 
C & D).   
 Other aspects that the cadets used to focus their collection efforts were the operational 
environment and civil considerations.  The operational environment aspects identified through 
the PMESII/ASCOPE interface not only provided the potential insurgent objectives, but also 
areas that could be influenced that have connections to those objectives.  Also, the cadets felt 
strongly that building rapport with the civilian populace could benefit the intelligence collection 
abilities, as local nationals would be more prone to provide information if they felt that it would 
benefit their families and neighborhoods. 
 One cadet specifically mentioned that he would spend considerable effort to collect in the 
neighborhoods where they do not support either the U.S. efforts or the insurgents.  “I would try 
to gain support by neutralizing insurgent activity in the neutral neighborhoods first.”  These 
neutral areas are important as they impact the ability of the insurgents to grow their numbers, the 
cadet believed.  Furthermore, he felt that passive collection was more important in these neutral 
areas, as it would not draw the insurgents’ attention to our activities.  His assessment was valid, 
as the neutral areas may provide a source of valuable information since the residents may have a 
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significant amount of information pertaining to the insurgency, but they were not willing to 
become involved without reason. 
Cadets’ favorability of utilizing the CTIAP for preparing threat courses of action.  
The cadets again responded overwhelmingly favorable toward the CTIAP when it came to 
preparing their threat courses of action.  As previously mentioned, they felt that this should be 
the doctrinal process, because “it just seems right”.  Some of the cadets also mentioned that as 
they were progressing through the case-based scenario, their familiarity with the CTIAP also 
grew.  All of the cadets provided a response of feeling very comfortable with using the CTIAP 
by this point in the case-based scenario. 
Summary of the details and completeness of the threat courses of action.  As I 
mentioned in the holistic section of the details and completeness of the threat courses of action, 
the cadets were able to effectively utilize the information that they had available when building 
their courses of action.  As evident from their responses, they also had a firm understanding of 
the CTIAP, as well as why the CTIAP assisted their ability to build detailed and complete 
courses of action.   
 The fact that the cadets built their evaluative criteria prior to analyzing reporting further 
demonstrated that the cadets spent enough time to build a method that could assist them in 
limiting or even controlling their biases.  By controlling biases as the intelligence analyst 
evaluates reporting was crucial to maintaining an unbiased approach while evaluating the courses 
of action.  The cadets were able to demonstrate that they could establish the criteria and adhere to 
it.   
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Developing a Comprehensive Target List   
After an intelligence analyst completes his analysis of the operational environment, 
builds threat models, prepares threat courses of action, and develops a collection plan, he then 
nominates potential targets for the commander to approve in order to defeat the insurgents.  
These targets may incorporate both lethal and non-lethal engagements, but typically the targets 
have been more lethal in nature.  The CTIAP proposes to incorporate lethal and non-lethal 
targets comprehensively in order to have greater impact on the insurgency and the operational 
environment. 
 The cadets prepared a target list based on the aforementioned sequence.  From the 
interviews with the cadets, the following themes have emerged: 1) Targets were incorporated 
both lethally and non-lethally, 2) Targets were PMESII driven, 3) Targets were prioritized, and 
4) Cadets’ response to favorability of utilizing the CTIAP when preparing their target list. 
Holistic nature of targeting lethally and non-lethally. The CTIAP’s greatest deviation 
from current doctrine is how targeting may be conducted.  I am not referring to the actual method 
of delivering fires, regardless of whether those fires are lethal or non-lethal, but more so along 
the lines of incorporating all aspects of the operational environment into the targeting process.  
The CTIAP delineates all targets, lethal or non-lethal, as an element of the operational 
environment in which they are related.  Therefore, a critical aspect of the intelligence analyst’s 
job is to identify those aspects that are interrelated to a specific target, and determine how those 
aspects can be attacked or influenced. 
 The cadets utilized this aspect of the CTIAP, and demonstrated that they not only 
understood how the operational environment potentially influences the respective target, but also 
appreciated the relationship of the target and the operational environment.  This further 
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demonstrates that the cadets were again able to continue building products that incorporated all 
of their previous work, and hence produce a detailed, all-encompassing, holistic product and 
assessment that provides more than just which insurgent should be captured or killed. 
Targets were incorporated both lethally and non-lethally.  All of the cadets followed 
the proposition set forward from the CTIAP; they incorporated lethal and non-lethal targets in 
their target list.  All of the proposed targets were valid, and within the operational capability of a 
U.S. military unit to conduct.   
 There were two major variations for the proposed targets that the cadets produced.  The 
first method, which was actually preferred in using the CTIAP, was identifying all aspects of the 
operational environment that may negatively affect the insurgents and nominate those as target 
(Appendix A).  After the targets were nominated, identify any relationship from the selected 
targets to other nodes or links that may be influenced.  The second method that was utilized by 
two cadets was to focus only on lethal targets, and then nominate non-lethal targets that were 
related to the stated lethal target (Appendix D).   
 Both methods were considered worthwhile, but I would still recommend utilizing the 
first.  While the second method would ensure that non-lethal targets were incorporated, the fact 
that this method was lethal-centric may appear that the true focus was capturing or killing the 
insurgents.  While there may be some truth in that aspect, if the U.S. was combating an 
insurgency or conducting counterterrorism operations, then a recognition that the local 
population as the center of gravity is of primary importance.  Therefore, nominating all targets 
that affect the greater populace may be more holistic than only focusing on capturing or killing 
insurgents or terrorists. 
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Targets were PMESII driven.  All five cadets developed their targets based on their 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface coupled with the threat model that they produced for each insurgent 
group respective to the specific objective driving the selected course of action.  Most of the 
targets were offensive in nature, where the cadets were focused on capturing or killing the 
insurgents prior to the actual attack, or a non-lethal target that could negatively impact the 
insurgents; for example hiring unemployed local citizens that could watch the major highways 
and serve as an obstacle for an insurgent who might want to establish a hasty mortar firing 
position. 
 There were targets nominated that were defensive in nature based on the aforementioned 
processes.  These targets were typically focused at defending the objective of the insurgents’ 
potential attacks.  For instance, one target nominated was built to where a company of U.S. 
Soldiers were guard the locations where political parties meet.  These defensive targets were 
important, as it demonstrated the cadets’ focus on identifying the insurgents’ goals, and 
objectives that needed to be manipulated to reach those goals. 
 There was nothing inherently wrong with building both offensive and defensive target 
sets.  In fact, it is logical given the nature of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations 
that one would want to focus some effort on protecting the operational environment.  The 
important point here was that all of the targets were focused on the PMESII/ASCOPE interface 
that defined the cadets’ operational environment picture. 
Targets were prioritized.  All of the cadets prioritized their target nomination list.  
There were two major ways in which they conduct this prioritization, one being based on the 
importance of the target to the insurgent’s mission and the other being based on the importance 
of the target to its impact on the operational environment.  For example, when prioritizing by 
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mission the insurgent leadership would typically be the most important targets.  However, in 
COIN, the population is the center of gravity and therefore ensuring that targets are built to 
prevent the insurgents from manipulating the population is more important than just targeting 
insurgents. 
 Either method was acceptable, but there was a targeting prioritization method that would 
assist the cadets as they conduct their analysis of target importance.  The U.S. Army’s doctrinal 
targeting process recommends utilizing a system defined through its acronym, CARVER.  
CARVER stands for criticality, accessibility, recoupability, value, ease, and recognizability.  
CARVER (or variation, CARVER-SHP) was not specifically part of the CTIAP, as the CTIAP 
itself provides a way for an intelligence analyst to prioritize targets through a relative worth to 
the specific course of action.   
 It appears the cadets did indeed attempt to prioritize their target nominations by utilizing 
CTIAP, with some differing focus as previously mentioned.  Based on the cadets’ products and 
responses, the doctrinal process would have prioritized the cadets’ target nominations.  The 
cadets did not use the CARVER method, but interestingly the CTIAP’s operational environment 
interface provided the cadets the ability to focus their targets.  The cadets prioritized their targets 
sufficiently for either the CTIAP or CARVER methodologies. 
Cadets’ favorability of utilizing the CTIAP when preparing their target list.  As 
previously seen with the favorability of utilizing the CTIAP for a specific part of the process, all 
of the cadets were very pleased with its relative simplicity and value of use.  All of the cadets 
reported that they were extremely favorable towards the process, and they again expressed that 
this seemed like a method that they would favor to use over the current doctrinal process. 
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 One cadet specifically responded that the focus on “…my previous products kept me 
focused as I nominated targets”.  The cadet was referring to how he utilized his operational 
environment interface to develop his target list. Another cadet mentioned that “…the operational 
environment is key, and my targets reflect that”.  Again, as the cadets continued to express that 
their confidence and comfort grew as they progressed through the process. 
Summary of targeting lethally and non-lethally.  Based on the products produced and 
the individual interviews conducted with the cadets, they understood what they were responsible 
for producing: a detailed targeting list that incorporated the operational environment both lethally 
and non-lethally.  The fact that they maintained the evaluative criteria established prior the 
building of courses of action, and the focus on the PMESII/ASCOPE interface assisted them in 
controlling their biases, they routinely demonstrated that they let the information speak for itself.   
 The comments from the cadets also provide an insight to how this process works, as 
routinely we can see that the CTIAP maintained their focus, kept them organized, and it was 
frequently mentioned to make more sense than current Army doctrine.  I should mention though 
that the CTIAP was built with incorporating doctrinal concepts, and then building a process that 
incorporated critical thinking methods into a domain-specific application.  The cadets further 
mentioned that they believed the CTIAP provided a multidimensional view of the battlefield and 
their analysis, which further highlights the goals of the CTIAP. 
Ease and Comfort of Using CTIAP 
 The last theme of my findings pertains to how the cadets responded to the ease of using 
the CTIAP, and their comfort with using it with the case-based scenario.  The responses were 
specifically focused to the cadets’ use of the CTIAP, and a comparison of the CTIAP versus the 
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current doctrinal process.  There were a few mentions to the doctrinal process, but this study was 
not a comparison between the CTIAP and current doctrine. 
 There were four major discussions that surfaced through my interviews with the cadet 
participants.  They were: 1)Did you utilize the CTIAP when conducting your analysis of the 
case-based scenario, 2) Do you believe your analysis was more objective and thorough with the 
CTIAP, 3) How effective do you feel that your analysis is for this scenario, and 4) How 
comfortable are you with using the CTIAP? 
Using CTIAP when conducting analysis of the case-based scenario.  All of the cadets 
reported that they used the CTIAP for the case-based scenario.  I specifically asked if they 
deviated from the CTIAP at any time during the scenario, and all of them reported that they did 
not.   
 I further asked the cadets if they felt they understood the CTIAP well enough, or if they 
had any misunderstandings or additional need for clarity as they were going through the case-
based scenario.  Again, all of the cadets responded that they felt they did understand the CTIAP, 
and did not have any need for clarity or further guidance. 
Objectivity and thorough using CTIAP.  The cadets felt that the CTIAP ensured that 
they remain objective while they were conducting their analysis, and furthermore, they 
responded that they could see how the process maintained their focus on remaining objective.  
They felt that the way the operational environment was defined ensured that they were using 
concrete data to focus the threat model and courses of action, and that was a comfort as they 
progressed through the scenario and had to absorb all the information from the case-based 
scenario. 
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 There was also a common theme from the cadets that the evaluative process of reporting 
was of tremendous added value.  The fact that they predetermined a value based on the source of 
information ensured that they were maintaining objectivity throughout their analysis of their 
holdings. 
 All of the cadets felt that the CTIAP was a very thorough process.  Again, not to compare 
the CTIAP to current doctrine, but a few cadets routinely responded that the CTIAP should be 
the doctrinal process for intelligence analysis.  All but one mentioned that the CTIAP was logical 
and easy to follow, while the other one said that it was logical, “…just not that easy”.  When I 
asked him what was difficult, he felt that there was a lot of information to consider, and at times 
he felt overwhelmed.  His response was not surprising, as intelligence analysts, even the most 
senior ones, frequently complain about information overload.  While there were significant 
efforts ongoing to develop more user-friendly databases, the reality was that there were 
significant amounts of data to read and sort through in a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism 
environment. 
Perceptions of effectiveness of analysis.  I asked the cadets a relatively tough question.  
I think it was tough because it can be difficult to assess one’s analysis without any data that 
provides answers to a specific situation.  With this question, that was the case: How well did you 
conduct your analysis without knowing what ultimately happened in the scenario?  Truth telling, 
this is a very real situation that intelligence analysts wrestle with quite often. 
 The cadets, on their own accord, responded with a numerical value ranging from 1 to 10 
(1 being lowest – ineffective, and 10 being highest – most effective).  The average response was 
a 7, with the lowest response being a 5 and the highest being an 8.  The cadets also reported that 
they felt the major concern with answering this question was a lack of experience.  They did not 
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know if their analysis would be effective or not.  It was a simple admission of not knowing what 
they did not know when it comes to how the intelligence was assessed after operations are 
conducted. 
 Interestingly, the cadets’ responses were a very real issue that I believe most intelligence 
analysts experience.  Based on my experience, many times the intelligence analysts were not 
even aware when an operation has been conducted based on their analysis, and when they were, 
the intelligence analyst usually does not receive significant feedback on what happened 
compared to what was provided.  Nonetheless, the cadets’ responses were interesting and 
valuable when considering that despite their lack of experience that they knowingly disclosed, 
they felt that the CTIAP was assisting them in providing reasonably effective analysis. 
Comfort with using the CTIAP.  Again, as I asked this question pertaining to the 
cadets’ comfort with using the CTIAP, the cadets responded with a numerical value.  That value 
was again based on a 1 to 10 scale, with the same parameters (1 being lowest and with least 
comfort, and 10 being highest and with most comfort).  The responses averaged an 8, with the 
lowest response being a 7 and the highest a 9.  The cadets all responded that they felt they were 
very comfortable with the CTIAP, and reiterated experience with the process being the only 
hindrance with their comfort level. 
Summary of the cadets’ response.  The research question for this study was: How does 
a domain-specific application of critical thinking to intelligence analysis provide a more holistic, 
comprehensive, and non-biased assessment that is pertinent to decision makers?  Based on the 
cadets’ products and answers from interviews conducted, it appears that we can see how a 
domain-specific application of critical thinking provides more holistic, comprehensive, and non-
biased assessments.   
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 The cadets routinely answered that the focus on the operational environment through the 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface proved to be essential for their baseline analysis.  The baseline 
analysis was updated when they received further information identifying aspects of the 
operational environment that affected both U.S. forces and the insurgent groups (and local 
populace as well).  The cadets further provide insight to how the operational environment 
assisted them in understanding their own mission, as aspects of the operational environment that 
are important to the insurgents are also important to the U.S.’ successful accomplishment of the 
mission. 
 Next, the cadets demonstrated that they were able to build specific threat models 
pertaining to each insurgent group present in the case-based scenario.  This demonstration 
highlighted to them the importance of understanding the capabilities of the insurgents, and began 
to help the cadets recognize potential indicators.  Again the cadets were able to integrate their 
previous efforts from the PMESII/ASCOPE interface into the threat models, and they were able 
to identify potential insurgent objectives as well as areas that could be influenced. 
 With the cadets’ threat courses of action; they established distinctive evaluative criteria 
that were utilized to assess incoming information.  This criterion helped them update their 
holdings in a non-biased manner, which helped ensure that the courses of action were specific to 
the insurgents and not to a preferred course of action.  I believe this was essential if an 
intelligence analyst is to provide that comprehensive assessment to a commander, which can then 
help drive the operations that the unit sequentially would conduct. 
 The target nominations further demonstrates that the cadets understood the purpose of the 
CTIAP, as they built a target list that integrated the operational environment with all targets, 
lethal and non-lethal.  The cadets applied all previous holdings to recommend their targets, and 
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the results are focused and specific locations, people, and interests that could have tremendous 
benefits in the conduct of operations. 
Panel of Experts’ Responses of Cadets’ Products and Analysis 
 I examined the responses of the panel of experts through the same five subsections that I 
utilized reporting the cadets’ data: 1) Understanding the Operational Environment, 2) 
Familiarization with the threat groups present in the case-based scenario, 3) Details and 
completeness with the threat courses of action, 4) Comprehensive target list, and 5) Ease and 
comfort of using CTIAP.  The panel of experts’ answers were specifically focused on the data 
presented, with the exception of subsection five.  I will be focusing on the panel of experts’ 
opinion of the CTIAP, and its potential for inclusion with U.S. Army doctrine and operations. 
Understanding the Operational Environment 
 The major themes that surfaced during the panel of experts’ interviews pertaining to the 
operational environment are, 1) Value of the PMESII/ASCOPE interface, 2) Defining the 
battlefield environment, 3) Ability to understand effects, and 4) Favorability of CTIAP’s 
approach to understanding the operational environment. 
Holistic view of understanding the operational environment.  One aspect of my 
research question is to understand how the CTIAP provides a holistic assessment to 
commanders.  The panel of experts provide significant input to this, as each of them have served 
either as a Battalion, Brigade, or Deputy Commander of units that would not only understand the 
value of understanding the operational environment, but also need to use that information for the 
benefit of their assigned mission. 
 The panel of experts quickly pointed out that the PMESII/ASCOPE interface was very 
holistic and detailed.  They expressed that this level of detail was important for commanders 
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since there was so much information coming in during counterinsurgency operations, a 
comprehensive and organized product such as the interface was invaluable. 
Value of the PMESII/ASCOPE interface.  All five experts immediately understood 
and expressed that the PMESII/ASCOPE interface provided a high degree of value to their 
ability to understand the operational environment.  The panel of experts all reported that this was 
the first time they had ever seen this product, and it provided a very detailed and holistic view of 
the battlefield.   
 Some of the comments that came out of the interviews specifically mentioned the value 
of the PMESII/ASCOPE interface.  First, one member stated that the PMESII/ASCOPE interface 
was “very valuable”, and he would definitely use such a product.  Another member mentioned 
that he was very comfortable with the interface, as it provides “a sound baseline”, and it was 
applied to the environment in a realistic and useable fashion.  A third member stated that he felt 
the interface understood the reality of “operations supersede boundaries”.  This refers to how 
military units operate within boundaries that are defined by a higher headquarters, and it is 
possible that those boundaries may constrain a unit’s ability to conduct operations.  The other 
two members’ comments were very similar to the ones already mentioned, with no significant 
additional points to consider.   
 The panel of experts’ comments here were important, as they were reminders to the 
intelligence community that unusable information was nice to know, but usability should be our 
primary focus.  This has been a challenge for intelligence analysts some times, as we want to 
provide our commanders with information that we think is important.  While the panel of experts 
was reminding us that the commanders should be considered as consumers of intelligence, 
analysts need to focus their efforts on what they need in order to be successful. 
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Defining the battlefield environment.  All of the members of the panel of experts 
believed that the PMESII/ASCOPE interface provided a detailed view of the battlefield.  They 
also stated that they felt it more than aptly defined the battlefield environment, and also there 
were unanimous responses that it did so more than the current doctrinal process. 
 Two of the panel members were so familiar with the intelligence doctrine and its efforts 
to define the battlefield environment; they immediately stated “this provides a familiarity that 
will help with collection”.  While the CTIAP was not built to explicitly skip steps in the 
analytical process, it should be noted that a seasoned analyst or one familiar with the process 
could easily see how the interface can provide direction for collection at the very beginning of 
the intelligence analysis process. 
Ability to understand effects.  As previously mentioned, the panel of experts instantly 
recognized the effects of the PMESII/ASCOPE interface.  There were multiple mentions 
pertaining to how they could utilize the detailed information the interface provides.  From the 
beginning of my interviews with the panel of experts, there were comments discussing how the 
interconnectedness of the information provided keep insight to pressure points and effects.  One 
expert commented that “…this highlights second and third order effects”, and another pointed 
out “…the environment is complex and intertwined”.  Without a doubt, the entire panel of 
experts recognized that the data presented in the interface provided a unique way to visualize 
battlefield effects, and they were very favorable toward the process. 
Favorability of CTIAP’s approach to understanding the operational environment.  
It was easy to see in the previous themes that the panel of experts’ remarks were very favorable 
toward the CTIAP approach to understanding the operational environment.  The previously 
discussed comments specifically stated that they found the process to be operationally-based, a 
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sound base-line of information, and can easily focus collection.  While these were not all of the 
comments that were made by the panel of experts, it was a concise synthesis of the many 
comments that essentially say the same.  All of the experts found favor with the CTIAP’s 
approach to understanding the operational environment. 
 I further asked the members of the panel of experts if they would use such a process in 
their units (assuming they would return to an operational unit after their assignment at West 
Point).  Again, all of the members reported that they would definitely use this process, as they 
asked for copies of the CTIAP to retain for their personal records.  The members of the panel of 
experts stated that they would spend time and effort to ensure that their staffs were trained in the 
CTIAP’s process of creating an interface based on the geopolitical and physical environments.   
Summary of understanding the operational environment.  The panel of experts found 
the CTIAP process of understanding the operational environment to be very valuable, and a 
reliable way to ensure that their intelligence analysts were focused on providing relatively bias-
free analysis.  The members of the panel of experts were surprised at the level of detail and 
fidelity the interface provided, but they were very thoughtful toward the value of such details.  
The panel of experts’ comments pertaining to focusing collection and operations demonstrated 
there was instant understanding of how to utilize the information presented in the 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface. 
Familiarization with Threat Groups 
 The discussion pertaining to the familiarization with the threat groups present in the case-
based scenario with the panel of experts was specifically focused toward how they, the panel of 
experts, understood the products that were presented and ability to use the information from an 
operational perspective.  As stated, the themes were the panel of experts’ understanding of the 
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products that were presented to them, and the panel of experts’ ability to use the information 
from the products produced by the cadets within an operational capacity. 
Understanding products of threat groups presented.  All of the members of the expert 
panel related that they completely understood the threat models that were presented to them.  
These were the products that the cadets produced from the case-based scenario.  One colonel 
specifically mentioned that these products “looked the work of a very seasoned analyst”.  
Another panel member first said “Wow”, and then asked me “These were produced by cadets?” 
Ability to use information from products produced by cadets within an operational 
capacity.  Again, all of the members of the panel of experts understood the products presented, 
and had a high level of appreciation for the details within.  All believed that the information 
presented was easily useable for operational development.  Three members of the panel even felt 
that the products presented were specific enough that they could already begin focusing 
collection efforts, and one member felt that the details were more comprehensive than completed 
courses of action that he had seen while in Iraq. 
Summary of familiarization with threat groups presented.  It was very apparent that 
the products the cadets produced, and presented to the members of the panel of experts, were 
well developed and provided significant detail.  All of the members of the panel of experts 
reported that the products were easy to understand, and of value.  There were also mentions of 
how valuable they were operationally, which further demonstrated the details presented. 
 It may be sufficient to say that the CTIAP provides tremendous clarity that can be 
utilized in various ways to support the operational mission.  The panel of experts were extremely 
pleased with the way the Operational Environment interface guided the product development that 
portrayed the insurgent groups present in the case-based scenario.  Similarly, the most telling 
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comment was the one that asked if a cadet produced these products.  It appears as if the CTIAP 
provides detailed and substantive data that reflects the work of a highly seasoned and 
experienced intelligence analyst.  This was the purpose of the CTIAP. 
Details and Completeness with Threat Courses of Action 
 I asked the panel of experts two questions pertaining to the threat courses of action that 
were presented to them:  Do these courses of action provide sufficient detail? And, how would 
you utilize the recommendations for collection?  I received multiple answers, which will be 
presented in the following discussion, but some themes did emerge.  Overall, all the members 
believed that the courses of action were very detailed and valuable for the purpose of focusing 
operations.  They also felt that the evaluation criteria were interesting and a worthwhile effort. 
 The themes that emerged are 1) The threat courses of action were very detailed and 
useful, 2) Commander’s intent is evident in the courses of action, 3) The courses of action focus 
lines of operation, and 4) Courses of action provide great focus for collection.  These themes 
provide insight to what a commander is looking for in the threat courses of action.  The fact that 
the members of the panel of experts refer to commander’s intent and lines of operation 
demonstrate a message as well for the intelligence analyst: make these threat courses of action 
relevant. 
Usefulness of threat courses of action.  The members of the panel of experts were very 
specific in their answer to the threat courses of action being detailed and useful.  Every single 
one replied “yes”, and then they immediately began explaining why the courses of action were 
detailed and useful.  The explanations were all very similar in content; they felt that the courses 
of action provided the necessary details to focus operations as insurgent objectives and goals 
were identifiable.  Indeed, this is the major objective in developing threat courses of action, and 
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this point is important as the panel of experts certainly recognized the value that could be 
ascertained from the details within the presented courses of action. 
 The panel of experts also understood the reasoning behind the evaluative criteria that 
determined the importance of the information within the courses of action, and the method in 
which they were prioritized.  One member stated that he had “never seen this concept, but I like 
it”.  Another member stated, “this is something we’ve been missing” as he reviewed one of the 
cadet’s evaluative matrix.  Overall, the members were unanimous in their support for the idea of 
developing an evaluative method that would help the intelligence analyst codify reporting, and 
they also seemed to favor one that provided a numerical system that helps avoid personal biases 
from becoming the bases for evaluating the relative importance of the information. 
Commander’s intent evident in courses of action. One major factor that focuses 
commanders in their development of friendly courses of action was commander’s intent.  
Commander’s intent comes from the highest levels of command within any military mission, and 
is reinforced through each successive level of command, as well as additional specific intent is 
further refined.  Intelligence analysts need to understand commander’s intent, as it defines a 
unit’s mission, as well as indirectly focuses the collection efforts that gather information 
pertinent to the mission’s accomplishment. 
 When the members of the panel of experts reviewed the threat courses of action, all of the 
members discussed how the courses of action supported the accomplishment of mission and 
commander’s intent.  One member keenly observed that “since these courses of action are 
developed through an operational prism, then they are already focused along commander’s 
intent”.  Another member mentioned that this methodology would support the development of 
friendly courses of action.  These comments provide evidence that support an acknowledgement 
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to the focus that developing courses of action derived through the operational environment 
reinforces those aspects of the commander’s intent. 
Courses of action focus lines of operation.  One doctrinal update that has arisen out of 
the U.S. Army’s current counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq was lines of operation.  
Lines of operation or LOO is a methodology to study the metrics involved with particular areas 
that a unit wants to impact in its mission.  LOOs are operationally based, and usually derived 
from the specific mission assigned to a unit and commander’s intent.   
 Three of the members of the panel of experts recognized that there was a parallel between 
the threat courses of action that were developed from the operational environment and the 
analysis conducted with the lines of operation.  One of the members stated that “this is a great 
way to fuse intelligence and operations, as the operational environment and lines of operation 
and developed similarly”.  A forth member stated that “this process provides another metric that 
can be assessed within the lines of operation”.  What the panel member meant was that the 
CTIAP was providing the operation’s section of a unit to evaluate the successes and/or failures 
of operations that have been conducted.  Since the insurgents’ activities were typically based on 
influencing specific aspects of the operational environment, then the intelligence analyst may be 
able to identify when the insurgents are focused on objectives that are more or less relevant 
toward their end state.  This type of an assessment could indicate that the counterinsurgent forces 
have been successful in denying specific areas to the insurgents. 
 All of the members felt that the threat courses of action complimented the operational 
evaluation that is conducted through lines of operation.  They also all felt that this should be a 
doctrinal concept, as some mentioned too often intelligence can be disconnected when not 
focused along the lines of operation.   
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Courses of action provide focus for collection.  All of the members of the panel of 
experts felt that the threat courses of action presented by the cadets provided great focus for 
collection.  Specifically the comments ranged from specific information could be turned into 
collection requirements to specific assets that could be utilized to gather the information that 
could confirm or deny the course of action.   
 Of additional note, the panel of experts felt that they understood the value of the 
information based on the evaluative criteria, and could therefore understand what information 
needed more additional collection requirements over others.  Also, there was an understanding 
that a lack of information could also mean that collection was not conducted, and therefore 
questions about the courses of action’s lack of specifics also was a by-product of the need for 
additional collection. 
Summary of details and completeness of threat courses of action.  Throughout the 
panel of experts’ comments, it is apparent that the CTIAP provides detailed and complete threat 
courses of action.  The panel members routinely commented how it provided ample information 
that would assist them when accomplishing their assigned mission(s).  The threat courses of 
action were well received and given high reviews from all the members of the panel of experts. 
 It may also be ascertained that the CTIAP provides holistic and potentially non-biased 
courses of action.  As the panel members mentioned, the courses of action nested with the 
commander’s intent and lines of operation that the operations sections evaluate in order to 
determine mission success.  Also, as noted through the evaluative criteria process, the 
information was presented based on an evaluation of source credibility, and not that of the 
intelligence analyst’s opinion.  The members noted these aspects, as they provide necessary 
details to understand how the CTIAP focuses analysis in a holistic and non-biased fashion. 
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Holistic Nature of Targeting Lethally and Non-Lethally 
 The CTIAP facilitates focus on combining both lethal and non-lethal targets into a 
comprehensive and deliberate targeting process.  The panel of experts recognized this point, and 
felt that this was a very important topic within the CTIAP.  The panel of experts seemed to 
appreciate this aspect of the CTIAP more than any of the previous subsection, most likely 
because this is specifically where the intelligence process begins to turn into the operations 
process. 
 There were four major themes that I derived from the interviews with the panel of 
experts.  They are, 1) the need to incorporate lethal and non-lethal targeting, 2) the benefit of 
utilizing the CTIAP for targeting, 3) ways in which the panel of experts would utilize the CTIAP 
for targeting, and 4) the panel members’ favorability toward the targeting process outlined in the 
CTIAP. 
The need to incorporate lethal and non-lethal targeting.  All of the members of the 
panel of experts felt that more effort was needed in current Army operations when it comes to 
combining the lethal and non-lethal targeting goals.  All five of them also favored the idea of 
combining these efforts into a single product that was focused along the lines of the unit’s 
mission or the lines of operation. 
 The panel members did point out that currently units do conduct lethal and non-lethal 
targeting, but as one member commented, “…while the targeting meeting is going on, the non-
lethal guys are meeting in another room”.  His point was well made; typically units do not 
integrate their lethal and non-lethal targeting efforts.  All of the members felt that the CTIAP’s 
focus on integrating lethal and non-lethal efforts should be joined, and it should be a complete 
staff effort. 
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The benefit of utilizing the CTIAP for targeting.  All of the members of the panel of 
experts felt that there was tremendous benefit with utilizing the CTIAP’s targeting methodology.  
Specifically, the point most often mentioned was the incorporation of the operational 
environment in the focus of the targets.  Similarly as I have mentioned, the effects that the 
targeting focus has toward the mission objectives is clear when utilizing an approach that focuses 
on the operational environment. 
 Two of the members of the panel of experts commented that the CTIAP focuses 
operations “…in a way that doctrine should be, but doesn’t”.  There was an overall consensus 
that the CTIAP’s targeting method was useful and potentially very valuable in both 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism environments. 
Ways in which the panel of experts would utilize the CTIAP for targeting.  The 
entire panel of experts mentioned that they would like to introduce the CTIAP’s targeting 
methodology into their units.  They also mentioned that they would like to spend the time to 
ensure the process was trained across the staff, and incorporate it into a few exercises in order to 
gauge the effectiveness of the process.  One member remarked that “this would probably serve as 
my decision making process”.  His reference indicated the CTIAP ensures that the entire staff 
may be incorporated into a methodical process that not only evaluates the potential threat, but 
also can focus unit operations as well.  The CTIAP process provides a commander or decision 
maker intelligence-driven operations, which an aspect appreciated by the panel of experts. 
 Another frequent comment was that the CTIAP provided a sure way to incorporate the 
entire staff into the decision making process.  The panel members commented that this was 
important because “the entire staff has a lot of specialization”, and incorporating the whole staff 
into the targeting process would definitely enable more resources. 
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The panel members’ favorability toward targeting process outlined in CTIAP.  From 
the previous remarks, all of the members of the panel of experts were very favorable toward the 
CTIAP’s targeting methodology.  There were comments from all members that this process was 
valuable and needed to be incorporated.  There were also comments ranging from how to bring 
the staff into the process as well as how to train the staff to use the process. 
The panel of experts’ opinion of CTIAP, and its potential for inclusion with U.S. 
Army doctrine and operations.  While this has been covered in the previous sections, it was 
deemed important enough to reemphasize the potential for the CTIAP’s inclusion in U.S. Army 
doctrine.  The panel of experts mentioned on multiple occasions that the CTIAP was a 
comprehensive methodology that incorporates both the intelligence processes with operational 
considerations, and that it should definitely be incorporated into doctrine. 
 The areas of considerable interest to the panel of experts are the PMESII/ASCOPE 
interface that incorporates the operational environment into all aspects of analysis and then 
subsequently the operations, the criteriological nature of how the information is evaluated in the 
threat courses of action, and finally the fusion of lethal and non-lethal operations into a joint and 
succinct product. 
Summary of case study.  The cadets and the panel of experts agreed that the operational 
environment interface that was created through an analysis of both PMESII and ASCOPE 
variables was the single most important aspect of the CTIAP that focused analysis in a 
comprehensive, holistic, and unbiased manner.  The interface ensured that the cadets’ analysis 
was focused toward the aspects of the operational environment that are essential for mission 
success.  The products that were produced based on the interface were pertinent and relevant for 
operational use, as the panel of experts attested to numerous times. 
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Examining Historical Counterinsurgencies 
 Grounded theory was utilized to provide insight as to why the CTIAP provides a 
comprehensive, holistic, and unbiased assessment, two historical counterinsurgencies were 
examined; U.S. Philippine War and British Malaya. Because the operational environment proved 
to be the most important basis for the analysis that was conducted with the CTIAP, my analysis 
of these two conflicts likewise focused on the operational environment.  Specifically, I examined 
how the counterinsurgent forces’ focus on influencing the operational environment contributed 
to the successful outcomes of these counterinsurgencies.  
 Both conflicts, U.S. Philippine War and British Malaya, were examples of a conventional 
army that deployed to suppress an insurgency.  Both conflicts also demonstrated how traditional 
military powers deployed against belligerents alone had little to no success against an 
insurgency.  Further both conflicts demonstrate that when military power is applied against the 
entire operational environment, the chance for success improves dramatically; as both of these 
successful counterinsurgencies illustrate. 
U.S. Philippine War 
 The U.S. Philippine War, 1899-1902, began when the United States annexed the 
Philippines after the U.S.’ victory of Spain in the Spanish-American War, and armed 
revolutionaries fought for Filipino independence.   The United States initially sent a small 
contingent of 5,000 Soldiers to secure the island in 1898, this action was met with resentment 
and frustration by the Filipinos.  By February 1899, armed conflict broke out between the 
Filipino revolutionaries and the United States. 
 Initially, the United States conducted the military action in the Philippines in a very 
conventional manner, but quickly moved to a counterinsurgency operation under the leadership 
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of Major General Elwell Otis.  MG Otis did not effectively integrate all subordinate efforts, 
which allowed subordinate commanders to wage the counterinsurgent fight in their own manner.  
After limited success in fighting the Filipino insurgents, the U.S. Army transitioned to a more 
robust counterinsurgency based way of conducting warfare.  Brigadier General Arthur McArthur 
refocused the strategy to not only fight the insurgents, but also improve the overall environment 
for the population.  One of the main strategies used during the U.S. Philippine War in the revised 
counterinsurgency phase was the creation of zones of protection.  The zones of protection were 
areas that the U.S. Army established to separate average citizens from the insurgents.  While this 
strategy had its critics, overall it proved successful and was a significant counterinsurgency effort 
that helped realize the eventual end of the war in the United States’ favor. 
The operational environment in the U.S. Philippine war.  The successful conclusion 
of the U.S. Philippine War should be recognized as a demonstration of leveraging the operational 
environment toward the objectives of the military mission.  U.S. forces recognized the need to 
focus on improving the operational environment as a whole, and benefitted accordingly.   
 Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young, initially was not a supporter of providing for the 
greater good of the society. He mentioned in September 1901 that “…what was required were 
‘the remedial measures that proved successful with the Apaches’”. (Linn, p. 211)  In other 
words, Young wanted a harsh campaign against insurgents and civilians alike.  However, by 
March of 1901, Young realized the benefit of focusing on improving the operational 
environment that affected both insurgent and civilian, when “…he had established 203 schools 
serving 10,714 students…there was a strong element of enlightened self-interest…”. (Linn, p. 
258). 
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 Young did not just stop with building schools, he eventually focused his efforts on 
rebuilding the entire civil structure, or what was his operational environment.  “Young and his 
brilliant chief of staff, Maj. John G. Balance, embarked on a comprehensive effort to build roads 
and schools, establish financial solvency, and bring order and good government to the 
population.” (Linn, p. 261)  It is rather clear that Young truly began to grasp that insurgents 
thrive due to a lack of effective legitimate governance, and by focusing on building or 
maintaining societal norms for the populace at large, the operational environment benefits 
favorably toward the counterinsurgents as the insurgents lose the ability to manipulate the 
people. 
 It should also be noted that reconstruction efforts not only help the operational 
environment, but support the counterinsurgent military effort as well. “Maj. Carter P. Johnson 
urged the construction of roads, both because they were ‘productive to the civilization of the 
country’ and because they would allow troops to move rapidly.” (Linn, p. 263)  When 
counterinsurgent forces improve the operational environment in which they are conducting 
operations, the operations also improve as freedom of movement improves; this is true in both 
physical as well as civil improvements.  “Americans could not force the guerrillas into battle, 
but…through the capture of lists of contributors, [they were able] to dismantle the guerrillas’ 
supply organization.” (Linn, p. 265) 
 Ultimately, the U.S. Army was able to effectively fight and destroy the Filipino 
insurgents through the various counterinsurgency operations they conducted.  The insurgents 
began to run out of safe havens, and they were unable to maintain logistical bases as well.  Less 
than a year (November 1901) of implementing the various actions toward improving the 
operational environment…”the Americans counteroffensive was in full swing as district 
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commanders pursued the guerrillas into previously inaccessible area.” (Linn, p. 273)  Six months 
from full implementation of this counterinsurgency strategy, Filipino President and strongman, 
Aguinaldo, was captured in April of 1902, thus effectively ending the U.S. Philippine War. 
Summary of U.S. Philippine war.  The U.S. Philippine War provides great insight to 
how effective counterinsurgency strategy can defeat an insurgency.  The strategy that the U.S. 
Army employed, while we would could some of the methods harsh by today’s standards, were 
focused and enabled a succinct method to separate guerrillas from non-combatants.  The strategy 
also improved the operational environment for the benefit of the counterinsurgents, and 
ultimately strangled the insurgents and their ability to fight. 
 One valuable lesson that was learned from studying the U.S. Philippine War, and the 
American strategy, lies in how effective strategy can have dual-uses.  This duality within the 
strategy of denying the insurgents their ability to effectively conduct operations, while improving 
the counterinsurgents’ freedom of movement was no small detail.  This lesson was not only 
important to understand, but also highlights how imperative it may be to deny the operational 
environment to the insurgents.  Insurgents and terrorists alike exploit the weaknesses within the 
operational environment, and the most effective strategies address that aspect and focus on 
combating and/or denying the insurgents or terrorists’ ability to utilize the operational 
environment in their favor. 
British Malaya 
 The British Malaya conflict, also known as the Malayan Emergency, grew out of post-
WWII economic collapse in Malaya.  Britain, which had strategic interests in Malaya as it was 
their primary source of tin and rubber, soon found itself in the middle of an uprising due to the 
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economic unrest.  Britain responded in 1948 by sending 13 battalions under the command of Sir 
General Harold Briggs to suppress the uprising, which quickly adopted the communist ideology. 
 The conflict lasted for 12 years, 1948-1960, with British and Malayan forces eventually 
defeating the communist insurgents.  Initially Sir General Briggs imposed a counterinsurgency 
doctrine that Britain used during the Boar Wars, where they created guarded camps or “New 
Villages” in order to separate the insurgents from the populace.  Unfortunately Brigg’s 
counterinsurgency strategy effectively ended there, as he did little to improve the operational 
environment and used the British forces in a very conventional manner.  The British conducted 
large movements-to-contact in order to engage the insurgent forces in the jungles of Malaya.  
The found very little success, as the insurgents simply avoided the loud and cumbersome effort.  
1951 and 1952 Britain realized that they were making little progress, and as a result Britain 
reviewed its strategy, replaced the commander, and began to fully implement a holistic 
counterinsurgency strategy. 
The operational environment in British Malaya.  After the first three years of the 
conflict, the British strategy was essentially one of conventional forces fighting conventionally.  
However, British commanders realized that they needed a change in strategy, and this can be 
best summarized by David Lloyd Owen’s remarks: “”They [British Soldiers] were flogging the 
jungle with enormous sweeps and that kind of thing, which is completely useless in this sort of 
war, and wasting a tremendous amount of effort.’” (Nagl, p. 80)   
 In 1952, Britain selected a new commander of the British conflict in Malaya, General Sir 
Gerald Templer.  Interestingly, amongst his experience commanding traditional combat arms 
units, Templer also served as the Director of Military Intelligence on the Imperial General Staff 
of the Eastern Command just prior to taking command of British forces in Malaya.  Templer 
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approached the job with an understanding that insurgents, or combatants, had to be removed 
from the civilian populace if the British counterinsurgency operation would succeed. 
 One of Templer’s first directives was to “impose a twenty-two hour daily curfew…” 
(Nagl, 89), as well as informing the civil leaders that insurgent or terrorist attacks must stop.  
Shortly after this directive as well as message to the civil leaders, information was supplied that 
lead to “…arrests of some forty Communist supporters…” (Nagl, p. 89).  Templer understood 
that he must include the operational environment into his strategy if the Malayan Communist 
insurgents were to be defeated.  His efforts had immediate impacts on the communist forces, and 
he began to form trusting relationships with the local populations through these efforts. 
 Templer furthered his strategy by incorporating essentially a general order for his 
subordinates.  Templer appeared to understand that all Soldiers and the way they conduct 
themselves has strategic impacts in a counterinsurgency.  Templer’s directive was important and 
rather simple: “1. Get the priorities right. 2. Get the instructions right. 3. Get the organization 
right. 4. Get the right people into the organization. 5. Get the right spirit into the people. 6. Leave 
them to get on with it.” (Nagl, p. 90) 
 It is rather apparent that Templer understood sound counterinsurgency concepts.  He 
successfully separated combatants from the populace, was hard but fair with the local leaders, 
and insisted on imparting effective standards for his subordinates.  “Perhaps Templer’s greatest 
contribution to the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign was his ability to coordinate all of 
the efforts – social, political, economic, police, and military to move Malaya forward…”. (Nagl, 
p. 100)  Templer understood that the operational environment was his center of gravity, and it is 
reflected in his actions and reflections as well. “’Military force cannot change opinion.  It can 
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only create a framework in which economic reform and good government can take effect.’” 
(Nagl, p. 101) 
Summary of British Malaya.  Similarly to the U.S. Philippines War, British Malaya was 
a conflict that demonstrated the following key points:  Conventional forces need to be cognizant 
of their role and strategy when fighting an insurgency, normal conventional operations are not 
sufficient when fighting a counterinsurgency.  Separating the combatants from the larger 
population is effective, although a substantial effort in itself.  Counterinsurgent forces focusing 
on improving the operational environment for the population, while denying the insurgents the 
ability to manipulate it for their purpose is essential, facilitates the ability to employ lethal 
counterinsurgency operations. 
 Britain’s efforts in Malaya were successful due to the realization that they needed to 
change from a conventional to a counterinsurgency-based effort.  General Sir Gerald Templer 
brought a rich and capable set of experience to the conflict, one where he was able to understand 
that insurgencies needed to be fought differently than normal army versus army operations.  He 
employed the key points that were aforementioned when conducting counterinsurgency 
operations, and was successful in defeating the communist insurgents.  Britain’s efforts reflect a 
tremendous success story, one where Malaya was ultimately able to realize independence and 
ultimately form Malaysia.  
Summary of historical counterinsurgencies.  Both historical examples of successful 
counterinsurgencies reflect the use of conventional military forces and their ability to transform 
into an effective counterinsurgency.  These examples demonstrate that the composition of 
military forces were not necessarily the key in defeating an insurgency, but rather the strategy 
used that employs the military forces needs to be sound. 
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 Both examples also demonstrate how the military strategy needed to evolve to combat an 
insurgency, and when the strategy did evolve, the counterinsurgent forces were very effective 
against the insurgents.  Also, both counterinsurgencies demonstrate how important it was to 
focus a counterinsurgency strategy by leveraging the operational environment.  The operational 
environment was necessary to both insurgents and counterinsurgents, and the main effort or 
center of gravity of the conflict lies in controlling the operational environment. 
 Interestingly, both examples demonstrate the value of separating the insurgents from the 
populace.  While both examples separated the insurgents by building effectively concentration 
camps, this strategy is obviously rather extreme.  As demonstrated, this extreme implementation 
of concentration camps worked, but more humane means can be found in current operations in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, where Coalition Forces live and work amongst the population.  Regardless 
of the method, denying the insurgents the ability to manipulate while safeguarding the population 
is the lesson to be learned in these examples. 
How the Cadets’ Responses Relate to the Historical Counterinsurgencies 
 In order to demonstrate how the cadets’ responses relate to the historical 
counterinsurgencies, I will examine them in context of the three major lessons’ that have been 
learned through the examination of the U.S. Philippines and British Malaya.  These three lessons 
include: 1.) Conventional forces need to be cognizant of their role and strategy when fighting an 
insurgency, normal conventional operations are not sufficient when fighting a counterinsurgency.  
2.) Separating the combatants from the larger population is effective, although a substantial 
effort in itself.  3.) Counterinsurgent forces focusing on improving the operational environment 
for the population, while denying the insurgents the ability to manipulate it for their purpose is 
essential, and facilitates the ability to employ lethal counterinsurgency operations. 
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Conventional forces need to be cognizant of their role and strategy when fighting an 
insurgency, normal conventional operations are not sufficient when fighting a 
counterinsurgency.  The cadets did recognize the difference between conducting operations in a 
COIN environment vice a traditional force-on-force conventional battlefield.  The 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface was the first definitive understanding that the COIN environment 
was different.  In a traditional force-on-force environment, the cadets would have produced a 
product that highlights where formations of armor and infantry can and cannot go on the 
battlefield.  The PMESII/ASCOPE interface highlights the unique operations of an urban 
battlefield, and while a traditional force-on-force battlefield can exist in an urban environment, 
the usage of PMESII is certainly more applicable to the COIN environment than the traditional 
force-on-force.  The cadets fully recognized this aspect, as they all made mention that the 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface provided them a clear understanding of the environment that the 
insurgents operate within. 
 The cadets also demonstrated an understanding that conventional military forces will not 
typically be engaged in significant force-on-force fighting with insurgents.  This resonated in the 
interviews, as the cadets appeared to value the data highlighted through their PMESII/ASCOPE 
interface, which they routinely referred to when approaching both collection and targeting 
efforts.  
Separating the combatants from the larger population is effective, although a 
substantial effort in itself.  A major point that was highlighted in both historical 
counterinsurgencies was the separating of the insurgents or combatants from the larger populace.  
It was important to point out that the way this was conducted in both the Philippines and Malaya, 
was not likely the way it would ever be conducted again.  In both conflicts, the separating of 
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insurgents from the populace was conducting in a rather brutal manner, and while it was 
ultimately effective, it was completely contrary to the manner in which most western militaries 
conduct themselves today.  Furthermore, with the tremendous explosion of media coverage on 
today’s battlefield, harsh methods of yesterday have little chance of being viewed as an 
acceptable part of modern strategy. 
 In my interviews, it was apparent that the cadets did understand that they still needed to 
find a way to separate or identify the insurgents for successful deliberate operations to be 
conducted.  Truly this is one of the intelligence field’s greatest challenges in the modern 
counterinsurgency environment.  These type of surgical operations need to have tremendous 
fidelity in the information that drives subsequent missions.  The cadets commented that the 
CTIAP does indeed provide strategies to assist in separating the insurgents through both the 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface, and the evaluative method of qualifying reporting. 
Counterinsurgent forces focusing on improving the operational environment for the 
population, while denying the insurgents the ability to manipulate it for their purpose is 
essential, facilitates the ability to employ lethal counterinsurgency operations.  An 
important axiom in counterinsurgency operations worthy of discussing was the battle for the 
hearts and minds of the population.  There were certain to be significant areas of concern that 
affect the populace, or the insurgent forces would not be able to find willing recruits.  Truly the 
counterinsurgent forces were conducting operations in order to combat the insurgency’s ability to 
manipulate the population for their own cause. 
 The cadets also readily understood this issue, as they conducted their analysis and 
highlighted the significant issues within the operational environment that had the largest impacts 
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on improving the overall welfare of the population.  Furthermore, they nominated targets that 
could deteriorate the insurgent’s ability to influence the population. 
Summary of how the cadets’ responses relate to the historical counterinsurgencies.  
The cadets demonstrated through both their responses in the interviews and the products they 
produced during the case-based scenario that they understood how the CTIAP affects the 
insurgent’s ability to conduct operations in a COIN environment.  They demonstrated a certain 
understanding that conventional military forces need to be focused on improving the operational 
environment rather than conducted large force-on-force engagements.  Also, they understood 
that there really was not a specific conventional operation that will be conducted in order to 
defeat an insurgency.  Rather it was a larger effort of removing the insurgents from the 
population, denying their ability to manipulate the operational environment, and improving the 
welfare of the populace. 
 The separation of the insurgents from the populace has been challenging in today’s 
environment.  This calls for clarity of analysis, focused collection, and meaningful targeting that 
incorporated both lethal and non-lethal capabilities in a united effort to improve the operational 
environment.  The CTIAP provides ways to identify potential insurgents and criteriologically 
evaluate reporting in a manner that can not only lead to better targeting, but furthermore deny the 
insurgent’s logistical efforts. 
 Finally, the most significant aspect of a counterinsurgency is removing the causes of the 
insurgents.  Improving the operational environment in a manner that provides for the populace-
at-large denies the insurgents the ability to recruit, and ultimately impacts the motivation of the 
insurgent’s goals.  Removing the insurgents’ ability to manipulate the population was an 
important effort that simultaneously improves the operational environment.  There was a natural 
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inverse relationship between the insurgents’ goals and the counterinsurgents’ efforts when 
battling over the hearts and minds of the people. 
The Panel of Experts’ Responses and Historical Counterinsurgencies 
 The panel of experts provided insight to how the CTIAP would be effective in 
counterinsurgencies.  I will highlight and discuss these insights in relation to the historical 
counterinsurgencies previously discussed.  The three major themes that arose from the panel of 
experts, and they seemed to all agree on the issues, were 1) the PMESII/ASCOPE interface helps 
ensure intelligence analysts are focused on the operational environment and its impacts on the 
insurgents, 2) integrated targeting, lethal and non-lethal, ensures all aspects of the warfighting 
functions are focused toward improving the operational environment, and 3) the focus of the 
CTIAP’s process needs to be applied at the right level of command. 
The PMESII/ASCOPE interface helps ensure intelligence analysts are focused on 
the operational environment and its impacts on the insurgents.  All of the members of the 
panel of experts were in complete agreement that the single largest contribution of the CTIAP 
was the PMESII/ASCOPE interface.  All respondents felt that the interface ensured that the 
cadets’ analysis originated and was maintained through an understanding of the operational 
environment.  They further went on to explain that the unit commander should be providing 
direction that was in synch with the goals of the accomplishing the assigned mission, which in 
turn should allow the intelligence analysts the ability to maintain their focus while analyzing the 
operational environment.  They all felt that the PMESII/ASCOPE interface was the best product 
that they have seen to date that helped ensure that intelligence effort was focused along these 
lines. 
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 The one area that the panel of experts expressed any concern with was that the 
intelligence analyst must constantly update their information in the PMESII/ASCOPE interface, 
as the COIN battlefield is very fluid and dynamic.  This was an area in which many of the panel 
members felt that intelligence analysts frequently dismiss when they are busy and challenged by 
the daily rigors of combat. 
Integrated targeting, lethal and non-lethal, ensures all aspects of the warfighting 
functions are focused toward improving the operational environment.  A common theme 
that was expressed by all of the members of the panel of experts was that units frequently fail to 
integrate lethal and non-lethal targeting into the larger objectives of the unit.  One member 
described his experiences relating to this concern, “…the targeting meeting had all the typical 
lethal fires members present almost daily, while the non-lethal effort met once a week in the far 
corners of the headquarters without key members of the staff”.  All of the members described 
similar situations, and few related any positive experiences when discussing their experiences 
with integrated lethal and non-lethal efforts.  This was an extremely important finding, as one of 
the key functions of the CTIAP was to enable lethal and non-lethal targeting integration into 
operations.   
The focus of the CTIAP’s process needs to be applied at the right level of command.  
One of the key aspects of the CTIAP was that lethal and non-lethal targets should be executed as 
simultaneously as possible; in fact, many lethal targets should have non-lethal operations built 
into them in order to maximize the impact of the operational environment.  During my first 
interview with one of the panel of experts, the member stated that in his opinion the CTIAP 
requires a significant amount of forces available to execute properly.  While we discussed what 
this strength requirement was, he stated that he felt a battalion could conduct up to three targets 
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given their personnel authorizations, but to fully realize the value of the CTIAP a brigade-sized 
unit would be more suitable. 
 I added this as a question for the remaining interviews with the panel of experts, and all 
agreed that a brigade did seem to be the most appropriate level for full implementation of the 
CTIAP, but that a battalion or even lower still could focus on utilizing the process.  Furthermore, 
one of the members mentioned that it is pretty rare for a battalion to conduct more than three 
operations in one day anyway, or that a company would conduct more than one a day.  So while 
the CTIAP seems to fit best with a brigade or above sized unit, this did not seem to be an issue 
that the panel felt would hinder its implementation at any echelon. 
Summary of the panel of experts’ responses relating to how the CTIAP is effective 
in counterinsurgencies.  The panel of experts’ responses relating to how the CTIAP is effective 
in a COIN environment was reflected in both historical counterinsurgency examples.  The 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface provides the counterinsurgent forces the ability to separate the 
insurgents from the population by identify key nodes that are essential to the insurgents that can 
be influenced by the counterinsurgents.  Another example from the historical 
counterinsurgencies was that the insurgents need the local populace for logistical support, and 
denying those resources have led to desperation by the insurgents that the counterinsurgent 
forces can leverage to engage the insurgent. 
 The integration of lethal and non-lethal targeting was very clearly demonstrated.  The 
building of infrastructure that provides benefits to the local populace was an example of how 
counterinsurgent forces can gain the trust of the people, which leads to intelligence gathered 
from grateful citizens that do not want the violence that comes along with insurgencies.  Many 
targets also contain both lethal and non-lethal implications to the operations that are conducted 
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executing the targets.  As the British Malayan conflict demonstrated, insurgents can also hold 
key or high ranking positions in the community.  If an insurgent, whom is also a key member of 
society, is targeted, then the counterinsurgent forces need to identify someone to fill the vacated 
licit role of the targeted insurgent. 
 A key insight provided by the panel of experts was the identification of the right unit 
echelon that the CTIAP could be fully integrated.  The panel of experts unanimously agreed that 
the brigade was the lowest level that has the personnel to execute all targets near simultaneously.  
This is an important aspect, as previously discussed with targeting that there could be multiple 
actions that would require specialized skills that can only be found at the brigade and above.  For 
instance, a civil affairs section is typically found at the brigade and above, and when a unit is 
targeting an insurgent like one that was previously used as an example, the civil affairs section 
can assist the unit commander in identifying perspective candidates. 
Summary 
 This study has demonstrated that a critical thinking based framework can improve 
intelligence analysis in order to provide more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased 
assessments.  Specifically, the CTIAP is the process that was utilized by a group of five cadets 
from the United States Military Academy at West Point who conducted analysis of a case-based 
scenario, and produced the corresponding products.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with the cadets, and the products were presented to a panel of experts, and then subsequent semi-
structured interviews were conducted with them.  What all of the interviews specifically 
expressed was that the CTIAP did indeed improve intelligence analysis in a holistic, 
comprehensive, and non-biased manner. 
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 The cadets unanimously agreed that the CTIAP provided an organized and meaningful 
way to understand the operational environment, conduct predictive analysis, and build specific 
and integrated lethal and non-lethal targets.  The panel of experts reflected the same opinion that 
the CTIAP was a tremendous improvement over current doctrinal processes, and they routinely 
mentioned that the products the cadets produced reflected the work of a very seasoned 
intelligence analyst. 
 The study of successful historical counterinsurgencies further provided tremendous 
insight into how the CTIAP works.  The historical counterinsurgencies highlighted how the 
operational environment is a key factor for the counterinsurgent forces to control in order to 
defeat the insurgents, and separating the insurgents from the populace is essential.  The 
separation of insurgents from the rest of the population can be achieved through controlling the 
operational environment, and incorporating a dynamic and comprehensive targeting strategy that 
attacks both lethally and non-lethally. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary of the Study 
 My research question for the study was: How does a domain-specific application of 
critical thinking to intelligence analysis provide a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased 
assessment that is pertinent to decision makers?  Based on my findings, intelligence assessments 
can be improved; specifically a critical thinking framework can be applied to the intelligence 
analysis process to provide more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessments that may 
be pertinent to decision makers.  This research has demonstrated that the Critical Thinking 
Intelligence Analysis Process (CTIAP) can and does provide intelligence analysts a tool to 
provide those invaluable assessments.  Furthermore, this research demonstrates that intelligence 
analysis can be improved to provide deeper and richer focus in a counterinsurgency or 
counterterrorism environment. 
 Various studies have demonstrated that critical thinking skills can be taught more 
effectively, and that they can be applied domain specifically to enhance the critical thinking 
skills of those individuals engaged in specific disciplines.  Research in the area of critical 
thinking has provided evidence that specific cognitive skills may be honed to improve an 
individual’s ability as a critical thinker, and that these skills can develop frameworks that can be 
applied to specific domains or disciplines. 
 Through working with Dr. Curt Friedel, I developed the CTIAP model to determine if 
critical thinking skills could be incorporated into the present framework of intelligence analysis 
(Hess & Friedel, 2008).  Dr. Peter Facione’s research was utilized to provide a definition, and 
identify specific cognitive skills found to exhibit effective critical thinking (Facione, 2010).  The 
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six cognitive skills are interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-
regulation (Facione, p. 5).  These skills were applied to the U.S. Army intelligence analysis 
process found in FM 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).  The focus of this 
study was to examine the utilization of the CTIAP with a sample of cadets at the United States 
Military Academy as they, apply the process in a case-based scenario.   
 The CTIAP framework focuses the analyst from the very beginning of the IPB process.  
Essentially, step one and two of IPB were fused together to identify all potential consideration of 
the battlefield through the study of the operational environment (Hess & Friedel, 2008).  This 
then provides the analyst the ability to focus his analysis on any potential threat group or other 
entity that needs consideration pertaining to the way they conduct operations, and the potential 
areas that these groups need to influence (Hess & Friedel).  Based on this, the analyst can begin 
to provide predictive analysis on those areas that may be specific to the groups in question (Hess 
& Friedel).  This process would then essentially provide a basis for a collection plan that the 
analyst may focus specifically to each group in question (Hess & Friedel). 
 Two methodologies were incorporated to complete this study; a case study and grounded 
theory.  Utilizing case study, cadets were asked to complete their analysis and corresponding 
products.  Five cadets volunteered for this study; they completed the case-based scenario, 
produced associated products, and then participated in a semi-structured interview.  The semi-
structured interviews that were conducted with each cadet, explored how well and why the 
CTIAP provided more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessments.  After the 
interviews, I presented the cadets’ products to a panel of experts, and conducted semi-structured 
interviews with them in order to gain their opinion to if the cadets’ analysis and products 
achieved the goal of providing holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased assessments that may be 
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valuable for decision makers.  Five colonels served as the panel of experts; they reviewed the 
cadets’ products and also participated in a semi-structured interview. 
 The next methodology I utilized was grounded theory.  I completed a study of two 
historical counterinsurgencies in which the counterinsurgent forces were successful in defeating 
insurgents.  This study allowed me to explore greater insight as to how the CTIAP provides 
focus for intelligence analysts to conduct their assessments as holistically, comprehensively, and 
non-biased while examining those aspects that historically facilitated success in a 
counterinsurgency.  
 In design, the CTIAP framework provides the analyst the ability to affect the operational 
environment in which he may be operating.  As he identifies the areas or targets that a potential 
group needs to affect, the analyst can identify the corresponding factors that may affect the 
overall operational environment.  This model was also designed so that it may provide the 
analyst the ability to assess the effectiveness of the operations that were and are being conducted. 
 The CTIAP was taught to the cadets based on the lessons identified in Chapter 2, Review 
of Literature.  The underlying critical thinking cognitive skills were taught overtly, as it has been 
demonstrated that overt instruction of critical thinking leads to significantly higher levels of 
critical thinking (Friedel et al, 2008).  I was lead instructor in teaching the CTIAP to the cadets 
utilized as a sample for this study, and I was able to frequently question them to ensure they 
understood all the aspects of the cognitive skills and the CTIAP.  This effort was in line with 
research by Mazer, Hunt, and Kuznekoff (2007), which found that interaction during instruction, 
was a very effective strategy to ensure understanding of material as well as effective in learning 
critical thinking skills. 
112 
 
 The two historically successful counterinsurgencies that were examined included the U.S. 
Philippines War and The British Malaya Emergency.  This study of these two 
counterinsurgencies provided valuable lessons of successful counterinsurgencies that highlighted 
how intelligence can provide more comprehensive and focused analysis to assist commanders 
and decision makers.   
Conclusions 
 The case study revealed five major themes from the products the cadets produced and 
from the individual interviews I conducted with them.  These themes are reflected in the 
interviews with the panel of experts, and are pertinent to the research question:  How does a 
domain-specific application of critical thinking to intelligence analysis provide a more holistic, 
comprehensive, and non-biased assessment that is pertinent to decision makers?  The case study 
five major themes: 1) Understanding the Operational Environment, 2) Familiarization with the 
threat groups present in the case-based scenario, 3) Details and completeness with the threat 
courses of action, 4) Comprehensive target list, and 5) Ease and comfort of using CTIAP. 
 There were three major lessons that were identified through the study of the historical 
counterinsurgencies, which led to success in both conflicts.  The strategy was more important 
that the composition of forces, in fact, both conflicts showcased that conventional military forces 
could effectively fight an insurgency.  The operational environment is center of gravity for both 
the insurgents and counterinsurgent forces.  And finally, insurgents need to be separated from the 
population in order to effectively defeat them. 
Finding 1 and conclusion 1:  Understanding the operational environment.  The 
cadets were able to build specific and detailed analysis of the operational environment through 
the ASCOPE/PMESII interface.  They provided products that demonstrated specificity and 
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understanding of the complex battlefield of the counterinsurgency or counterterrorism 
environment.  The panel of experts agreed that the cadets’ products were produced to a high 
level of proficiency and detail, and that it was perhaps the most valuable product produced. 
 Ernst and Monroe (2006) examined how the environment affects critical thinking skills 
and dispositions, and found that critical thinking skills can indeed be cultivated through the use 
of incorporating environmental considerations into instruction.  The CTIAP provided a means of 
incorporating specific environmental considerations, and with a case-based scenario reinforced 
those critical thinking skills.  The products produced as well as the responses in the interviews of 
both the cadets and panel of experts confirms that these critical thinking skills can be honed and 
applied in a domain-specific manner. 
Finding 2 and conclusion 2:  Familiarization with the threat groups.  The cadets 
demonstrated the ability to organize and understand the threat groups present in the case-based 
scenario.  The products produced as well as the interviews conducted demonstrated a thorough 
understanding of the tactics that the insurgents utilize.  The panel of experts also responded very 
favorably with the cadets’ products, and felt that the cadets presented the threat as if they were 
seasoned analysts. 
 In a study conducted by Sungar and Tekkaya (2006), it was found that problem-based 
learning enabled students to perform at high order thinking levels.  This was definitely found to 
be true in this study, as the cadets were able to correlate the information produced from their 
PMESII/ASCOPE interface into usage and detailed products that demonstrate how the insurgents 
conduct operations.  This is extremely valuable if an analyst is to effectively utilize this type of 
data and transform it into actionable intelligence. 
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Finding 3 and conclusion 3:  Details and completeness with the threat courses of 
action.  The major findings for the details and completeness with the threat courses of action 
were reflected in the details of the products and responses in the interviews with the cadets.  The 
cadets had developed a holistic evaluation of the operational environment and threat models of 
the insurgents, and produced courses of action on what they expected the insurgents to do next.  
They also established criteria in order to identify objectives and potential areas that they would 
need to focus collection.  The panel of experts agreed that the cadets had provided considerable 
detail and useful information as to what the insurgents were targeting, and potential collection 
efforts to confirm or deny these indicators. 
 The study conducted by Schumm, Webb, Turek, Jones, and Ballard (2006) that was 
conducted at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College found that students benefited 
from collaborative exercises, Socratic questioning, and domain-specific applications of critical 
thinking skills.  The cadets’ products and responses agree with the findings, as in the instruction 
Socratic questioning was utilized, and there was considerable collaboration as vignettes were 
discussed during the instruction.  The CTIAP reaffirmed domain-specific application of critical 
thinking skills, and by the time the cadets were preparing threat courses of action, they were 
leveraging information that was built upon layers of data that was produced through the CTIAP 
process. 
Finding 4 and conclusion 4:  Comprehensive target list.  The cadets produced 
comprehensive targeting lists that prioritized and organized lethal and non-lethal targets.  This 
was extremely important as the targets developed become operations that have a direct impact on 
the overall success or failure of the mission.  The cadets’ targets were specific to whom or what 
they believed had specific impact on the insurgents’ objectives.  The panel of experts agreed that 
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the targeting methodology was useful, and the recommended targets were worthwhile.  The 
cadets also recognized the importance of reviewing the successes and/or failures of targeting and 
those impacts on the mission objectives. 
 A study conducted by Facione (1998) found that effective critical thinking instruction 
motivates as well as incorporated critical thinking skills.  The targeting strategy and responses of 
the cadets demonstrated that they were indeed motivated in learning the CTIAP as well as 
participating in the case-based scenario.  All five cadets were willful participants, and recognized 
that they were learning skills that were far advanced for their experience level, as well as level of 
responsibility.  The cadets and the panel of experts all recognized that targeting is one of the 
most important aspects of the CTIAP and operations in general, and they spent considerable time 
understanding and incorporating the value of both lethal and non-lethal targeting. 
Finding 5 and conclusion 5:  Ease and comfort of using the CTIAP.  The cadets 
reported in the interviews that they felt the CTIAP was relatively easy to learn and utilize during 
the case-based scenario.  The cadets responded that the CTIAP was organized, and very sensible 
in its approach of conducting intelligence analysis.  The cadets were novices when it came to 
intelligence analysis, and they had very limited training in intelligence as a whole compared to 
an intelligence analyst that has ten or more years of experience.  Interestingly, the panel of 
experts made comments that they felt that they were looking at products produced by analysts 
with years of experience, and in some cases, they liked the cadets’ products better than anything 
they had seen before. 
 A study of nursing students and their dispositions toward critical thinking skills 
conducted by Colucciello (1997) utilized Facione’s Delphi Study (1990) to develop her own 
framework for domain-specific application of critical thinking skills.  She found that critical 
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thinking skills improved and could be assessed more thoroughly through individual evaluations.  
Colucciello’s research, along with Facione’s (1998) research on motivation in critical thinking 
instruction demonstrate how students not only develop critical thinking skills, but they can be 
improved, assessed, and provide motivation through domain-specific application of cognitive 
skills that are built into usable frameworks.  Evidence from the cadets’ products and interviews 
confirmed this research, as they demonstrated significant motivation, as well as producing 
products at the level of a seasoned analyst. 
Finding 6 and conclusion 6:  Strategy focus on insurgents (or terrorists).  Both the 
U.S. Philippines War and The Malayan Emergency demonstrated how important it was to 
develop an effective strategy to fight an insurgency.  In both historical examples, conventional 
forces were utilized, and finally understood how to utilize them effectively to fight in a 
counterinsurgency operation.  The strategy was tailored to fight the insurgents in relation to their 
objectives, and the conventional forces were utilized in a manner consistent with the goals of the 
strategy.  The conventional forces were not necessarily trained and organized to fight an 
insurgency, but as the right commanders ensured the appropriate strategy was communicated, 
then the counterinsurgent forces became very effective in deny the insurgents the ability to 
achieve their goals. 
 In Schadlow’s (2010) study of organizing the political terrain, she argues that military 
forces need to incorporate effective efforts when fighting insurgents.  She further argues that 
political and economic factors need to be incorporated in the military effort, but recognizes that 
military forces need to adapt in order to deny insurgents’ their goals and objectives.  Schadlow’s 
arguments were very important and were reflected in both historical examples, and reaffirmed 
the necessity to develop sound counterinsurgency strategy with the forces they have available. 
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Finding 7 and conclusion 7:  The operational environment is the center of gravity.  
Both historical examples completely highlight the importance of the operational environment, 
and also confirm that it is the center of gravity to the success of the insurgents.  In both 
examples, the counterinsurgent forces denied the insurgents their ability to target governmental 
functions (after an effective strategy was in-place), and other areas that supported the insurgents’ 
goals.  By focusing on the operational environment, the insurgents lost their ability to manipulate 
the situation that affected both the populace and the government, as counterinsurgent forces 
denied the insurgents’ freedom of movement and ability to continue disrupting necessary goods 
and services.  Members of the panel of experts pointed out that the strategy was immensely 
important, and even to the detail of what echelon the CTIAP should be implemented.  The 
general consensus was that the CTIAP can be implemented partially at all echelons, but for full 
implementation, it would need to be at the Brigade and higher levels. 
 Henry Nuzum (2010) argues this same point when he examined the Vietnam War.  He 
found that intelligence analysts need to understand and leverage the operational environment in 
their analysis, and then the goals of the insurgents become clearer.  The historical examples 
completely agree with Nuzum’s argument, as the operational environment is indeed the center of 
gravity, and the analysis should focus on was to deny or influence the insurgents’ objectives. 
Finding 8 and conclusion 8:  Separate the insurgents from the populace.  Perhaps the 
most important finding in both historical counterinsurgencies was the separation of insurgents 
from the population contributed to the successful war efforts.  In both examples, after the 
insurgents were physically separated from the populace, the counterinsurgent forces were able to 
effectively find them, and ultimately defeat them.  It was also important to note that the manner 
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of which the insurgents were separated would not necessarily be readily embraced today, but the 
lesson still remains – the insurgents need to be separated from the population. 
 In both Schadlow’s (2010) and Nuzum’s (2010) research, they argue the importance of 
leveraging factors of the operational environment to combat an insurgency.  As previously noted, 
their arguments were sound, but they can also provide an intelligence analyst the ability to find 
indicators on insurgent activity.  The CTIAP specifically focuses on establishing criteria in 
reporting in order to assess the quality of information based on sources of data.  This may prove 
effective for an intelligence analyst when he recognizes the insurgents’ objectives, and focuses 
collection on those indicators.  The separation of insurgents from the populace can be found in 
aspects of the operational environment that need attention and constant deliberation in order to 
build those indicators and recognize them.  
 The cadets were able to identify these lessons in their conduct of the analysis produced in 
the case-based scenario.  Their focus on the operational environment demonstrated that they 
recognized that influencing the PMESII and ASCOPE factors in the counterinsurgent forces 
favor provided those forces a marked advantage.  Further, the cadets built their objectives and 
enemy templates through areas within the operational environment that the insurgents would 
attempt to control, influence, or manipulate based on their modus operandi.   
 The cadets were also able to focus on arguably the most important aspect learned from 
the study of the historical counterinsurgencies – separating the insurgents from the populace.  
The assessments that were produced provided various techniques that could either physically 
separate the insurgents from the populace, or potentially highlight indicators that could be 
collected on in order to separate the insurgents.  Through the separation of the insurgents, the 
intelligence analyst gains a position of advantage, as precision targeting would naturally be more 
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effective as it maintains a separation from the populace at large.  Finally, the separation of 
insurgents from the population allows a greater ability for the counterinsurgent force to apply 
both lethal and non-lethal targeting operations more effectively, and allows a more coherent way 
to assess achievement. 
 The CTIAP, an analytical framework built from the six critical thinking cognitive skills 
identified through Dr. Facione’s Dephi Study (2010), provided the cadets the ability to 
incorporate critical thinking skills into a more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased 
assessment that could be very useful to decision makers.  The CTIAP effectively incorporated 
the operational environment into a single product that can be used to focus successful 
counterinsurgent strategies that have been demonstrated through historical studies.  A panel of 
experts received the products of the analysts with great praise, and acknowledged that the CTIAP 
was a significant improvement in the conduct of intelligence analysis.  Finally, all these aspects 
demonstrate that effective counterinsurgency is fought over the operational environment where 
the insurgents and their goals can be combated both lethally and non-lethally. 
Recommendations 
 There were many recommendations that I could focus on in order to continue both 
improving the CTIAP or more effective ways to build critical thinking frameworks that may 
benefit intelligence analysis.  There were two areas that I recognized over the course of my study 
that probably need the most attention:  proper echelon where the CTIAP could be fully integrated 
real-world application and assessment of the CTIAP, and conventional warfare aspects that could 
be improved through the CTIAP or similar model. 
 One issue that came out during my interviews with the panel of experts was the echelon 
that the CTIAP should be implemented for full effect.  This issue arose during my very first 
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interview with a member of the panel of experts, and was addressed during my second interview.  
I quickly added it as a discussion in the last three interviews.  All five members of the panel felt 
that this indeed was an issue that needed further exploration.  Also, all five also felt that they 
believed the Brigade level would probably be the lowest level for full implementation.  They did 
believe that the Battalion level could implement the CTIAP, but for full implementation, where 
all targets could effectively be influenced by all aspects of military capabilities (lethal and non-
lethal), Brigade was the lowest level that could accomplish that feat.   
 The final area that needs additional research in order to fully evaluate the CTIAP’s 
usefulness and potential will be applying the process to a conventional force-on-force scenario.  
The CTIAP was specifically built for application in either a COIN or counter-terrorism 
environment.  The specific build of the PMESII/ASCOPE interface to define the operational 
environment would not apply to a conventional scenario.  There may be methodologies for the 
conventional environment, but that would indeed require additional research, testing, and 
evaluation.  I believe it would be important to conduct an evaluation of the CTIAP or another 
critical thinking based process that could provide more holistic, comprehensive, and non-biased 
assessments in a conventional environment.   
 I speculate one area needing special attention in the conventional environment may be the 
aspect of time.  In a conventional environment, events on the battlefield may be fluid and rapid, 
with little time to second guess or spend considerable amounts of time trying to determine what a 
specific indicator might mean.  Further, there may also be little time to evaluate conducting one 
operation over another.  Regardless, incorporating critical thinking skills have shown to be 
effective in the CTIAP.  For military intelligence instructors, a framework incorporating critical 
thinking skills in a domain-specific manner applied to the conventional environment may prove 
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to be worthwhile and a valuable way to train intelligence analysts.  This additional research 
would be worthwhile, and may result in saving lives. 
 An additional consideration needs mention, and that is of the study of historical 
counterinsurgencies.  This study examined two successful counterinsurgencies in order to 
understanding factors that could lead to understanding the value of the CTIAP.  Additional 
studies should be conducted that examine unsuccessful counterinsurgencies in order to identify 
the lessons that could be incorporated for future counterinsurgencies.  
 If future intelligence analysts would utilize the CTIAP in the future, they need to consider 
a few issues prior to initiating their analysis.  First, the CTIAP was built for counterinsurgency or 
counterterrorism operations.  If an intelligence analyst finds himself in a conventional war, or 
peacekeeping operation, then that analyst should understand that the CTIAP may not provide the 
level of detail that it does for a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism environment.  Another 
issue for an intelligence analyst to consider is that the CTIAP is built to be flexible.  The process 
may need to be modified for a specific mission, and the analyst needs to understand the value of 
defining the operational environment prior to building insurgent or terrorist templates.  The 
CTIAP may prove to be a worthy process that may focus operations, which may result in more 
specific operations.   
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APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE CADET ANALYSIS 
 
Scenario 3:  Counterinsurgency Operations 
Target 1 (Non -Lethal):  Bardolph – This town in divided in its support, but appears to have the 
most potential for significant gains in supporting the home nation.  It is also a main entry point 
into the area that can serve as a solid base of support for operations further into the area of 
operations. 
Political:  Provide neutral support to the political system, but find ways to encourage and 
facilitate legitimate political development and operations (i.e. security at multi-party political 
meetings, interaction with heads of each political group, US forces remain neutral in political 
dialogue and actions).  The insurgency appears to be accessing the people via political parties, 
so, while neutrality must be enforced, violent dialogue or political actions meant to provoke 
violent conflict must be limited. 
Military:  A possible insurgent TAA is located to the south of the town with several available 
approaches to either conduct attacks on friendly military and on the civilian populace.  They 
could possibly occupy the high ground to the southwest and southeast of the town.  Clearing NAI 
1 and denying enemy access to NAI 1 and the surrounding high ground should be the primary 
military target for friendly forces.  NAI 3 and the high ground to the east of the town (easily 
accessible to enemy from NAI 3) should be the primary secondary target because this high 
ground offers control of the local road. 
Economy:  The town is located near crops and pasturelands, as well as being located near the 
main road in the region, suggesting that the economy functions on trade of agricultural products.  
The town must be allowed to maintain control of its lands and the road in order to continue 
economic sustenance.  The enemy must be denied access to these lands and be prevented from 
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conducting ambushes on the roadway in order to continue economic access to the remainder of 
the country and the other local towns in the region. 
Social:  The town is divided decently clearly between supports of the home nation in the north 
and supporters of the insurgency in the south.  This is likely due to the insurgency’s increased 
access to the southern half from TAA 1.  Friendly forces must maintain peace throughout the 
town, but most heavily along the boundary between the two areas in order to facilitate stable 
interactions and ease of movement between parts of the town.  There must be no noticible 
difference in treatment between populations of the two halves in order to avoid frustrating either 
side from perceived preferential treatment.   
Infrastructure:  The main road passing east of the town must be secured for civilian and friendly 
travel.  This is the most valuable infrastructural asset to not only Bardolph, but the entire region.  
The road facilitates ease of movement for trading, social connection, access to the rest of the 
country.  The road must be protected from possible enemy ambushes on friendly forces or 
civilian forces.  Maintenance of the road is also vital to usability. 
Intelligence:  Friendly forces should focus on tracking possible connections between political 
members and insurgent leaders.  We should aim to cut off any funding or monetary/supply 
exchanges between the two groups. 
Target 2 (non-lethal/lethal):  Bushnell 
Political:  Support for the home nation is limited, but a sizeable part of the population remains 
neutral (100), although a majority classify as strong supporters of the insurgents (150).  Because 
a neutral population is more vulnerable to change and sensitivity to friendly interaction, the main 
targets must be social, economic, and infrastructural in order to establish a positive regard toward 
friendly troops.  Political facilitation should follow the same procedure as Target 1 
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Military:  The enemy has access to Bushnell from TAA 1 (north) and TAA 2 (east) with no 
significant land barriers.  Priority is to clear and deny enemy access to these two areas (TAA 1 
primarily due to its close proximity to the neutral population).  The insurgents must not be 
allowed to conduct raids or ambushes from these locations. 
Economy:  Bushnell lies at an important intersection between two roads, two of the three that 
allow the best access to the home nation and each other.  These routes, along with the availability 
of crop and pasture land, indicate that mobility and trade are the key economic pieces to this 
town.  Security on these two main roads and in marketplaces is a top priority. 
Social:  Similar makeup to Target 1.  Must facilitate peaceful interaction between the two sides 
of the city and allow great food access to southern region.  Neutrality vital. 
Infrastructure:  As noted in Economy, maintenance of the roads and intersection are imperative 
to allow the town to continue stable everyday living and trade. 
Intel:  Targeting of civilians for intelligence gathering should be limited due to the fragility of the 
population, meaning that sources must be allowed to come to us.  Intelligence gathering must be 
low-key and peaceful, with a particular ear for the public’s reaction toward friendly actions and 
techniques. 
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE CADET TARGETING MATRIX 
 
SCENARIO THREE ANALYSIS 
 
Reference: FM 34-130 (pgs: 3-55 to 3-75) 
 
Primary Area Target: Beardstown (The portion on the friendly side of the river) 
 
 P: Neutralize major access point to EN supporting nation 
 M: Destroy main military supply node – limit capabilities across all of HN 
 E: Destroy ability to easily access food and other sustainment  
 S: Neutralize the efficiency of a heavy social support area 
 I: Major production area and key transportation link to sympathetic border nation  
I: Neutral support areas can be used to gain high quality intel due to their close proximity 
to major EN operational areas – only if we can prove we can provide safety 
 
Personnel Targets: 
LETHAL TARGETS NON-LETHAL TARGETS 
CORMIER – kill – no major civilian 
associations and confirmed major EN leader 
and relationship node – radical groups only 
JENKINS – associated with groups we can use 
to pressure him socially and politically 
MARTINEZ – kill – same as above HALBLEIB – strong ties to important 
agricultural class – exploit methods to turn but 
do not kill despite heavy EN associations – 
possible heavy influence at grass-roots level 
JOHNSTON – kill – same as above  
 
EN COA: After the sequence of strikes, insurgents will collapse back into Beardstown and away 
from Macomb and other high threat areas as Beardstown is a central node for political, military, 
and sustainment. We will be able to isolate them and inflict at least noticeable casualties when 
they mass. Emphasis will be on key leaders. This move will shift pressure off the population and 
give us a period of time to secure the inward regions of the HN and gain trust before the EN can 
re-adjust. We will have successfully taken the initiative from the enemy in a full-spectrum, 
sequential purge. Emphasis will be on combined and rapid effects on multiple targets at once if 
possible. 
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APPENDIX E: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
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